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ABSTRACT
The continuous expansion of the Internet in the past 20 years has greatly facilitated the
booming development of Internet business. Unfortunately, some unscrupulous participants
in Internet business conduct fraudulent activities for their own profits at the expense of other
parties. In this proposal, we present our study on the fraudulent activities in two kinds of
major Internet businesses—online advertising and E-commerce.
Online advertising is leveraged by online advertisers to deliver marketing messages topotential customers. It serves as a significant source of revenue for web-based businesses
and is crucial to a thriving Internet ecosystem. However, click fraud is posing a serious
threat to online advertising systems. As the direct victims, advertisers still lack effective
defense against click fraud. In this proposal, we present a novel approach for advertisers to
detect click fraud without the helps from ad networks or publishers. Our proposed defense is
effective in identifying both clickbots and human clickers, while incurring negligible overhead
a t both the server and client sides.
In an E-commerce market, a store’s reputation is closely tied to its profitability. Sell
ers’ desire to quickly achieve high reputation has fueled a profitable underground business,
termed by us as a seller-reputation-escalation (SRE) market. An SRE market operates as a
specialized crowdsourcing marketplace and facilitates online sellers to harness human labor
ers to conduct fake transactions for improving their stores’ reputations. In this proposal, we
characterize the SRE markets in terms of its prevalence, business model, market size, and
the sellers and laborers involved. We also evaluate the effectiveness of the SRE services on
reputation escalation.
An online photo could disclose much more information beyond w hat is visually depicted
in the photo and what its owner expects to share. In this dissertation, we aim to raise public
awareness of privacy risks resulting from sharing photos online. We first investigate the
prevalence of privacy information among digital photos. Then we study the policies adopted
by online media sites on handling the m etadata information embedded in the photos they
host. Finally, we introduce an attack vector not yet exploited before and demonstrate its
surprising power in identifying a photographer with just one photo she ever took.
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Investigating Fraudulent and Privacy Activities in Online Business

C hapter 1
In trod u ction
W ith the popularity of the Web, the Internet has been widely used for conducting
business communications, collaboration, and transactions for almost two decades. A
number of web-based online marketplaces have sprung up such as Amazon, eBay, and
Taobao. In the recent years, the global Internet coverage has been further increased
thanks to the explosion of mobile devices.

The Internet-related economy today

accounts for an increasingly significant portion of global Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).
Accompanied by the booming development of Internet business, Internet fraud
has become a serious and pervasive security problem. W ith a monetary motive, mis
creants defraud victims to disclose their personal information or conduct fraudulent
transactions by various means such as distributing malware, presenting fraudulent
solicitations, and hacking websites. Internet fraud has resulted in annual global
monetary loss of hundreds of billions of US dollars [1].
In this dissertation, we characterize and detect the fraudulent activities in on
line advertising systems and e-commerce marketplaces, and also assess privacy risks
arising from online photo sharing activities. Specifically, we propose a novel de
2

tection method to identify the fraudulent clicks on the ads from the perspective of
online advertisers; we conduct an in-depth measurement study on newly discovered
underground markets, which facilitate e-commerce sellers to harness human laborers
to perform fake transactions for rapidly improving their stores’ reputations; finally
we investigate the prevalence of private sensitive information among digital photos
and explore the potential privacy threats resulting from online photo sharing. For
our future work, we plan to develop a novel detection system to capture those fake
transactions conducted on e-commerce marketplaces.

1.1

D e te c tin g C lick Fraud in O n lin e A d v e rtisin g
S y s te m

In online advertising systems, advertisers pay ad networks for each click on the
former’s ads, and ad networks in turn pay publishers a share of the revenue. As
online advertising has evolved into a multi-billion dollar business [2], click fraud has
become a serious and pervasive problem. For example, the botnet “Chameleon”
infected over 120,000 host machines in the U.S. and siphoned $6 million per month
from advertisers [3].
Click fraud occurs when miscreants make H TTP requests for destination URLs
found in deployed ads [14]. Such H T T P requests issued with malicious intent are
called fraudulent clicks. The incentive for fraudsters is to increase their own profits
at the expense of other parties. Typically a fraudster is a publisher or an advertiser.
Publishers may p u t excessive ad banners on their pages and then forge clicks on
ads to receive more revenue. Unscrupulous advertisers make extensive clicks on a
com petitor’s ads with the intention of depleting the victim’s advertising budget.
3

Click fraud is mainly conducted by leveraging clickbots, hiring human clickers, or
tricking users into clicking ads [15]. In an act of click fraud, both an ad network
and a publisher are beneficiaries while an advertiser is the only victim, under the
pay-per-click model. Although the ad network pays out to the publisher for those
undetected click fraud activities, it charges the advertiser more fees. Thus, the ad
network still benefits from click fraud. Only the advertiser is victimized by paying
for those fraudulent clicks. Therefore, advertisers have the strongest incentive to
counteract click fraud. In this dissertation, we focus on click fraud detection from
the perspective of advertisers.
We propose a novel approach for an advertiser to independently detect click
fraud attacks conducted by clickbots and human clickers. Our approach enables
advertisers to evaluate the return on investment (ROI) of their ad campaigns by
classifying each incoming click traffic as fraudulent, casual, or valid. The rationale
behind our design lies in two observed invariants of legitimate clicks.

The first

invariant is th at a legitimate click should be initiated by a real human user on a
real browser. T hat is, a client should be a real full-fledged browser, and hence it
should support JavaScript, DOM, CSS, and other web standards widely followed
by modern browsers. The second invariant is th at a legitimate ad clicker interested
in advertised products must have some level of user engagement on the advertised
website. Based on the design principles, we develop a click fraud detection system
mainly composed of two components: (1) a proactive functionality test and (2) a
passive examination of browsing behavior. The functionality test challenges a client
for its authenticity (a browser or a bot) with the assumption th at most clickbots
have limited functionality compared to modern browsers and thus would fail this
test.

The second component passively examines each user’s browsing behaviors
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on the advertised website. Its objective is to identify human clickers and those
much advanced clickbots that may pass the functionality test.

To evaluate the

effectiveness of the proposed detection system, we build a prototype and deploy
it on a large production web server. Then we run ad campaigns at one major ad
network for 10 days. The experimental results show th a t our approach can detect
much more fraudulent clicks than the ad network’s in-house detection system and
achieve low false positive and negative rates.

1.2

U n d ersta n d in g th e E m erg in g R e p u t a t io n -E sca la tio n a s-a -S erv ice in E -co m m erce S y s te m

Due to its convenience and ubiquitous nature, online shopping has become one of
the primary means for purchasing goods. In many cases, due to its global nature,
lower cost, and fast delivery, online shopping is the preferred or even the exclusive
means of acquiring a product. To offer a means for buyers to give feedbacks on the
products and the sellers, a large number of online shopping markets including Ama
zon and eBay have incorporated reputation systems. The reputation systems could
encourage sellers to provide better products because through the scoring process
they are rewarded with higher reputations, which in tu rn can a ttra ct more business.
For instance, sellers with higher reputations are usually listed at the front by online
market search engines, and shoppers are biased towards sellers with higher repu
tations [66]. Thus, online sellers have strong motivation to improve reputations as
quickly as possible. In the majority of reputation systems, sellers’ reputations are
dominated by the number of transactions they complete and the number of positive
customer ratings (or reviews) they receive.
5

However, depending on the popularity of a product, it usually takes a long time
for a seller to accumulate high reputation. As a result, a non-negligible number
of insincere sellers have attem pted to subvert the reputation systems using opinion
spams and artificial ratings, among others. Several recent works [62, 53, 63] have
aimed to tackle these problems.

However, we show th at the known reputation

manipulation techniques are only the tip of the iceberg of an emerging underground
industry th a t employs sophisticated methods to cater to online sellers who want
to quickly boost their store reputations.

We refer to such enterprises as seller-

reputation-escalation (SRE) markets.
SRE markets operate in the crowdsourcing model, where online sellers hire in
expensive human laborers to carry out fake purchase campaigns to accelerate rep
utation accumulation. By fake purchases, we mean purchases th a t although they
appear legitimate and complete as far as the online system is concerned, no real
product or at most an empty package is delivered by a seller. This approach is far
more elaborate and much more difficult, if not infeasible, to detect because a buyer
appears to have genuinely purchased a product as opposed to just leaving a review
or score for the product and its seller. Moreover, multiple individuals th at do not
know each other are involved in the process.
For insincere sellers, fake purchases can significantly increase their transaction
volumes, product ratings, and positive reviews. The boost in overall reputation
attracts legitimate customers and at the same time cements the seller’s ability to
deal with negative reviews. Furthermore, the process is fairly scalable, and the seller
may post up to hundreds of such tasks each day for quickly improving the store
reputation. Therefore, SRE markets are seriously endangering existing reputation
systems widely deployed in current e-commerce platforms. Although SRE markets

6

have appeared for several years, we still lack insights into the basic characteristics
of this underground enterprise.
In this dissertation, we perform a detailed analysis of SRE markets by infiltrating
five SRE markets specializing in providing reputation-escalation services to sellers
on Taobao marketplace [27], the largest consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online mar
ketplace in China. We conducted daily crawls of these five markets for two months,
collected 219,165 tasks posted by more than 11,000 online sellers, and continuously
monitored these sellers’ activities on these markets. We characterized the sellers
and workers involved, and we estim ated the revenue generated and fake-transaction
volume handled by these markets. Furthermore, we report a more threatening ser
vice recently launched by one SRE market where Taobao sellers can increase their
reputation scores significantly during a single day1 by paying less than $100 to the
SRE market operators. Given our insights into the SRE operations, we propose pos
sible intervention approaches from the perspective of defenders. Finally, we revisit
the SRE ecosystem one year later to reveal how the dynamism of the SRE markets
changes over time and track the statuses of these Taobao sellers we identified to be
using SRE services before.
In summary, our main contributions are threefold:
• To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze in depth the operations of SRE
markets and perform the empirical study of them.

We estimate th at the

five SRE markets we infiltrated generated at least $46,438 in revenue and
handled at least $3,452,530 in fake-transaction volume during the two months
we monitored.
• We investigate the effect of SRE markets on online store reputation escala
1A Taobao seller earns one reputation score for each completed transaction with good ratings.

tion. We find th a t online sellers using SRE services can increase their store
reputations 10 times faster than legitimate ones, and about 25% of them are
visibly penalized in the form of either having reputation scores deducted or
zeroed, or being forcibly shut down.
• We revisit the SRE ecosystem one year later and observe th at the SRE markets
are not as active as before.

There are evident declines in daily new task

postings and daily active sellers on the SRE markets. Moreover, about 17%
of these involved Taobao stores do not exist any more, probably due to heavy
penalties imposed by Taobao for fake transactions.

1.3

A sse ssin g P r iv a cy R isk s o n O n lin e P h o to s

W ith the proliferation of cameras, especially smartphone cameras, it is now very
convenient for people to take photos whenever and wherever possible. Furthermore,
the prevalence of online social networks and photo-sharing sites greatly facilitates
people to share their digital photos with friends online. Every day around 1.6 million
photos are shared on Flickr [72], one of the largest online photo sharing sites.
In their rush to share digital photos online, well-intentioned people unwittingly
expose much hidden m etadata information contained in the digital photos. The
m etadata information such as camera serial number may seem relatively innocent
and trivial but could create significant privacy threats to photographers2 and the
people depicted in the photo. Unfortunately, one study [85] shows th at up to 40%
of high-degree participants do not even know the term m etadata. The situation
2By photographer we mean the person who took the photo rather than a person who works as
a photographer.
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becomes worse concerning the fact th a t a photo could linger on the Internet for
years.
During the spread of a digital photo, online social network (OSN) services and
other media sites usually serve as the sink.

Online media sites often compress

and resize the photos they host for space saving. Media sites may even remove
the m etadata information in the photos they host. However, users usually do not
know what the online services will do with their uploaded photos [85]. Thus, it
is im portant to raise the public awareness of the potential privacy risks posed by
m etadata leakage and increase their knowledge of how online media sites handle the
photos they uploaded.
To better describe contemporary digital photos, we create a taxonomy and clas
sify digital photos into different stages based on the life cycle and the propagation
process, which are: “fresh,” “intact,” and “wild.” “Fresh” photos are just freshly
taken with a camera. “Intact” photos have been uploaded online but remain intact
from the hosting sites. “W ild” photos may have been post-processed multiple times
by the hosting sites. In this dissertation, we perform a data-driven assessment of
privacy risks on contemporary digital photos. Specifically, we examine digital photos
at the three stages in term s of m etadata information contained and potential privacy
risks, and we further explore the photo handling policies adopted by online media
sites. Finally, we introduce a new attack vector and demonstrate th a t some other
trivial looking m etadata information could be exploited to launch re-identification
attacks against photo owners.
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1.4

F u tu re W orks

In our previous work, we investigated a new advanced technique of manipulating
seller reputations, i.e., the seller-reputation-escalation (SRE) service, which enables
sellers to hire thousands of cheap human laborers to conduct fake transactions.
Based on our deep understanding of this advanced reputation manipulation tech
nique, for our future work, we are going to develop a practical fake transaction
detection system in cooperation with one large e-commerce marketplace. The pro
posed system will allow e-commerce marketplaces to detect all existing forms of fake
transactions in real time.

1.5

O rg a n iza tio n

The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents our
research efforts on detecting click fraud in an online advertising system from the
perspective of advertisers. Chapter 3 presents our investigation of an emerging un
derground industry, termed as SRE markets, where a potentially unbounded number
of inexpensive human laborers are hired by e-commerce sellers to conduct fake pur
chases for reputation inflation. Chapter 4 describes our investigation of online photo
privacy issues. In Chapter 5, we conclude the dissertation and propose our future
research work on developing a practical and real-time fake transaction detection
system from the perspective of e-commerce marketplaces.
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C hapter 2
Click Fraud D etectio n on th e
A d vertiser Side
Click fraud detection is not trivial. Click fraud schemes have been continuously
evolving in recent years [14, 23, 12, 15, 19]. Existing detection solutions attem pt
to identify click fraud activities from different perspectives, but each has its own
limitations. The solutions proposed in [21, 20, 22] perform traffic analysis on an
ad network’s traffic logs to detect publisher inflation fraud. However, an advanced
clickbot can conduct a low-noise attack, which makes those abnormal-behaviorbased detection mechanisms less effective. Haddadi [18] proposed to leverage bait
ads for blacklisting malicious publishers based on a predefined threshold. Motivated
by [18], Dave et al. [15] proposed an approach for advertisers to measure clickspam ratios on their ads by creating bait ads. However, running bait ads increases
advertisers’ budget on advertisements.
In this chapter, we present our work on detecting click fraud in the online adver
tising system from the perspective of advertisers. Our proposed detection mecha
nism is composed of two components. The first component is proactive functionality
11

test. We test a client’s functionality against web standards widely supported by
modern browsers. Failing the test would induce all clicks generated by the client
to be labelled as fraudulent. The second component is passive browsing behavior
examination. Only if a client passes the functionality test and also shows enough
browsing engagement on the advertised website, the corresponding click is labelled
as valid. Otherwise, a click is labelled as casual if the corresponding client passes
the functionality test but shows insufficient browsing behaviors. A casual click could
be generated by a human clicker or by an unintentional user. We have no attem pt
to distinguish these two since neither of them is a potential customer from the
standpoint of advertisers.
Our detection mechanism can significantly raise the bar for committing click
fraud and is potentially effective in the long run after public disclosure. To evade
our detection mechanism, clickbots must implement all the main web standards
widely supported by modern browsers. And a heavy-weight clickbot will risk itself
of being readily noticeable by its host. Likewise, human clickers must behave like
real interested users by spending more time, browsing more pages, and clicking more
links on the advertised sites, which contradicts their original intentions of earning
more money by clicking on ads as quickly as possible. At each point, the net effect
is a disincentive to commit click fraud.
The chapter is organized as follows. We provide background knowledge in Section
2.1. Then, we detail our approach in Section 2.2 and validate its efficacy using realworld d ata in Section 2.3. We discuss the limitations of our work in Section 2.4 and
survey related work in Section 2.5. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 2.6.
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2.1

B ack grou n d

Based on our understanding of the current state of the art in click fraud, we first
characterize clickbots and human clickers, the two main actors leveraged to commit
click fraud. We then discuss the advertiser’s role in inhibiting click fraud. Finally,
we describe the web standards widely supported by modern browsers, as well as
feature detection techniques.

2.1.1

C lickbots

A clickbot behaves like a browser but usually has relatively limited functionality
compared to the latter. For instance, a clickbot may not be able to parse all elements
of HTML web pages or execute JavaScript and CSS scripts. Thus, at the present
time, a clickbot is instantiated as malware implanted in a victim ’s computer. Even
assuming a sophisticated clickbot equipped with capabilities close to a real browser,
its actual browsing behavior when connected to the advertised website would still be
different from th a t of a real user. This is because clickbots are autom ated programs
and are not sophisticated enough to see and think as human users, and as of yet,
do not behave as human users.
A typical clickbot performs some common functions including initiating HTTP
requests to a web server, following redirections, and retrieving contents from a web
server. However, it does not have the ability to commit click fraud itself but instead
acts as a relay based on instructions from a remote bot m aster to complete click
fraud. A bot master can orchestrate millions of clickbots to perform automatic and
large-scale click fraud attacks.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how a victim host conducts click fraud under the command
of a botmaster.

First, the botm aster distributes malware to the victim host by
13
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F ig u re 2.1: How a clickbot works
exploiting the host’s security vulnerabilities, by luring the victim into a drive-by
download or running a Trojan horse program. Once compromised, the victim host
becomes a bot and receives instructions from a command-and-control (C&C) server
controlled by the botm aster. Such instructions may specify the target website, the
number of clicks to perform on the website, the referrer to be used in the fabricated
H TTP requests, what kind of ads to click on, and when or how often to click [14].
After receiving instructions, the clickbot begins traversing the designated pub
lisher website. It issues an H T TP request to the website (ste p 1). The website
returns the requested page as well as all embedded ad tags on the page (ste p 2).
An ad tag is a snippet of HTML or JavaScript code representing an ad, usually in an
iframe. For each ad tag, the clickbot generates an H TTP request to the ad network
to retrieve ad contents just like a real browser (ste p 3). The ad network returns
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ads to the clickbot (step 4). Prom all of the returned ads, the clickbot selects an ad
matching the specified search pattern and simulates a click on the ad, which triggers
another H T TP request to the ad network (step 5). The ad network logs the click
traffic for the purpose of billing the advertiser and paying the publisher a share,
and then returns an H T TP 302 redirect response (step 6). The clickbot follows the
redirection path (possibly involving multiple parties) and finally loads the advertised
website (step 7). The advertiser returns back the landing page 1 to the clickbot
(step 8). At this point, the clickbot completes a single act of click fraud. Every
time an ad is “clicked” by a clickbot, the advertiser pays the ad network and the
involved publisher receives remuneration from the ad network. Note th at a clickbot
often works in the background to avoid raising suspicion, thus all H TTP requests
in Figure 2.1 are generated without the victim ’s awareness.

2.1.2

H um an clickers

Human clickers are the people who are hired to click on the designated ads and get
paid in return. Human clickers have financial incentives to click on ads as quickly
as possible, which distinguishes them from real users who are truly interested in the
advertised products. For instance, a real user tends to read, consider, think, and
surf the website in order to learn more about a product before purchase. A paid
clicker has few such interests, and hence tends to get bored quickly and spends little
time on the site [13].
la n d in g page is a single web page that appears in response to clicking on an ad.
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2.1.3

A dvertisers

Advertisers are in a vantage point to observe and further detect all fraudulent ac
tivities committed by clickbots and human clickers. To complete click fraud, all
fraudulent H TTP requests m ust be finally redirected to the advertised website, no
m atter how many intermediate redirections and parties are involved along the way.
This fact indicates th a t both clickbots and human clickers must finally communi
cate with the victim advertiser. Thus, advertisers have the advantage of detecting
clickbots and human clickers in the course of communication. In addition, as the
revenue source of online advertising, advertisers have the strongest motivation to
counteract click fraud.

2.1.4

W eb standards and feature d etectio n techniques

The main functionality of a browser is to retrieve remote resources (HTML, style,
and media) from web servers and present those resources back to a user [4]. To cor
rectly parse and render the retrieved HTML document, a browser should be com
pliant with HTML, CSS, DOM, and JavaScript standards which are represented
by scriptable objects. Each object is attached with features including properties,
methods, and events. For instance, the features attached to the DOM object include
create A ttribute, getElementsByTagName, title, domain, url, and many others. Ev
ery modern browser supports those features. However, different browser vendors
(and different versions) vary in support levels for those web standards, or they im
plement proprietary extensions all their own. To ensure th at websites are displayed
properly in all mainstream browsers, web developers usually use a common tech
nique called feature detection to help produce JavaScript code with cross-browser
compatibility.
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Feature detection is a technique th at identifies whether a feature or capability
is supported by a browser’s particular environment. One of the common techniques
used is reflection. If the browser does not support a particular feature, JavaScript
engines return null when referencing the feature; otherwise, JavaScript returns a
non-null string. For instance, if the JavaScript statem ent “document.createElement”
returns null in a specific browser, it indicates th at the browser does not support the
method createElement attached to the document object.

Likewise, by testing a

browser against a large number of fundamental features specified in web standards
for modern browsers, we can estim ate the browser’s support level for those web
standards, which helps validate the authenticity of the execution environment as a
real browser.
Feature detection techniques have three prim ary advantages. First, feature de
tection can be an effective mechanism to detect clickbots. A clickbot cannot “pass”
the feature detection unless it has implemented the main functionality of a real
browser. Second, feature detection stresses the client’s functionality thoroughly,
and even a large pool of features can be used for feature detection in a fast and
efficient manner. Lastly, the methods used for feature detection are designed to
work across different browsers and will continue to work over time as new browsers
appear, because new browsers fundamentally support reflection—even before imple
menting other features—and should also extend, rather than replace, existing web
standards.

2.2

M e th o d o lo g y

Our approach mainly challenges a visiting client and its user engagement on the
advertised site to determine whether the corresponding ad click is valid or not. To
17
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F ig u re 2.2: Outline of click fraud detection mechanism
maximize detection accuracy, we also check the legitimacy of the origin (client’s IP
address) and the intermediate path (i.e., the publisher) of a click.
Figure 2.2 provides an outline of our approach. Our detection system consists
of three components: (1) JavaScript support and mouse event test, (2) browser
functionality test, and (3) browsing behavior examination.
For each incoming user, on the landing page, we test if the client supports
JavaScript and if any mouse events are triggered. No JavaScript support or no
mouse event indicates th a t the client may not be a real browser but a clickbot.
Otherwise, we further challenge the client’s functionality against the web standards
widely supported by mainstream browsers. The client failed the functionality test is
labelled as a clickbot. Otherwise, we further examine the client’s browsing behav
ior on th e advertiser’s website and train a behavior-based classifier to distinguish a
really interested user from a casual one.

2.2.1

JavaScript support and m ou se even t test

One simple way to detect clickbots is to test whether a client supports JavaScript
or not. This is due to the fact th at at least 98% of web browsers have JavaScript
enabled [5] and online advertising services usually count on JavaScript support.
Monitoring mouse events is another effective way to detect clickbots. In general,
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a human user with a non-mobile platform (laptop/desktop) must generate at least
one mouse event when browsing a website. A lack of mouse events flags the visiting
client as a clickbot. However, this may not be true for users from mobile platforms
(sm artphones/pads). Thus, we only apply the mouse event test to users from nonmobile platforms.

2.2.2

F unctionality test

A client passing the JavaScript and mouse event test is required to further undergo
a feature-detect ion based functionality test.
Chrome(lO)

Firefox(lO)

IE(5)

Safari (10)

Opera(lO )

1.0.154
4/24/2009
12.0.742.100
6/14/2011
2.0
10/24/2006
7.0
9/27/2011
6.0
8/27/2001
3.1
3/18/2008
5.0.1
7/28/2010
8.50
9/20/2005
10.50
3 /2 /2 0 1 0

2.0.173
6/23/2009
16.0.912.63
12/7/2011
3.0
6/17/2008
11.0
3/13/2012
7.0
10/18/2006
3.2
11/14/2008
5.0.3
11/18/2010
9.10
12/18/2006
11.00
12/16/2010

4.0.223
10/24/2009
20.0.1132.47
6/28/2012
3.5
6/30/2009
15.0
8/28/2012
8.0
3/19/2009
3.2.2
2/15/2009
5.1
7/20/2011
9.20
4/11/2007
11.50
6/28/2011

5.0.307.1
1/30/2010
24.0.1312.57
1/30/2013
3.6
1/21/2010
19.0.2
3 /7/2013
9.0
3/14/2011
4.0
6/18/2009
5.1.2
11/30/2011
9.50
6/12/2008
12.00
6/14/2012

8.0.552.215
12/2/2010
27.0.1453.94
5/24/2013
4.0
3/22/2011
20.0.1
4/11/2013
10.0
10/26/2012
4.0.5
3/11/2010
5.1.7
5/9/2012
10.00
9 /1/2009
12.15
4 /4/2013

Table 2.1: Tested browsers, versions and release dates
To avoid false positives and ensure th at each modern browser can pass the func
tionality test, we perform an extensive feature support measurement on the top 5
mainstream browsers [6]: Chrome, Firefox, IE, Safari, and Opera. To discern the
consistently supported features, we uniformly select 10 versions for each browser
vendor with the exception of 5 versions for IE. Table 2.1 lists the browsers we
tested. As a result, we obtain a set of 153 features associated with web standards,
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including browser window, DOM, and CSS (see Table 2.2). All those features are
supported by both desktop browsers and their mobile versions. These features are
commonly and consistently supported by the 45 versions of browsers in the past ten
years. We call this set the authentic-feature set. We also create a bogus-feature set,
which has the same size as the authentic-feature set but is obtained by appending
“123” to each feature in the authentic-feature set. Thus, every feature in the bogusfeature set should not be supported by any real browser. Note th at we just use
the string “123” as an example. When implementing our detection, the advertiser
should periodically change the string to make the bogus-feature set hard to evade.
O b je c ts
indow (51)

F ea tu res
closed, defaultS tatus, document, frames, history, alert, blur, clearlnterval, clearTim eout,
close, confirm, focus, moveBy, moveTo, open, print, prom pt, resizeBy, resizeTo, scroll,
scrollBy, scrollTo, setlnterval, set T im eout, appCodeNam e, appN am e, ap p Version, cookieEnabled, platform , userAgent, javaEnabled, availHeight, vailW idth, colorD epth, height, w idth,
length, back, forward, go, hash, host, hostnam e, href, pathnam e, po rt, protocol, search,
assign, reload, replace

DOM(26)

doctype, im plem entation, docum entElem ent, createElem ent, createD ocum entFragm ent, createTextN ode, createCom m ent, createA ttribute, getElem entsByTagN am e, title, referrer, do
main, URL, body, images, applets, links, forms, anchors, cookie, open, close, write, writeln,
getE lem entB yld, getElementsByName

CSS(76)

backgroundA ttachm ent, backgroundColor, backgroundlm age, backgroundR epeat, border,
borderStyle, borderTop, borderRight, border B o tto m , borderLeft, borderT opW idth, borderR ightW idth, borderB ottom W idth, borderLeftW idth, borderW idth, clear, color, display, font,
fontFamily, fontSize, fontStyle, fontVariant, fontW eight, height, letterSpacing, lineHeight,
listStyle, listStylelm age, IistStylePosition, listStyleType, m argin, marginTop, m arginRight,
m arginB ottom , marginLeft, padding, paddingTop, paddingR ight, paddingB ottom , paddingLeft, textA lign, textD ecoration, tex tln d en t, textT ransform , verticalAlign, whiteSpace,
w idth, wordSpacing, backgroundPosition, borderCollapse, borderTopC olor, borderRightColor, borderBottom Color, borderLeftColor, borderTopStyle, borderRightStyle, borderBottom Style, borderLeftStyle, bottom , clear, clip, cursor, direction, left, minHeight, overflow,
pageBreakA fter, pageBreakBefore, position, right, tableL ayout, top, unicodeBidi, visibility,
zlndex

Table 2.2: Authentic feature set widely supported by modern browsers
H ow to perform th e fu nction ality te st.
functionality test is performed.

Figure 2.3 illustrates how the

For the first H T T P request issued by a client,

the advertiser’s web server challenges the client by responding as usual, but along
with a mixed set of authentic and bogus features. While the size of the mixed set is
fixed (e.g.,100), the proportion of authentic features in the set is randomly decided.
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1. HTTP Request
2. HTTP Response & a mix set of authentic / bogus features
3. Report # of authentic features to server as response to challenge
Client
Advertiser’s Web Server

F ig u re 2.3: How the functionality test is performed by advertiser’s web server.
Then, those individual authentic and forged features in the set are randomly selected
from the authentic and bogus feature sets, respectively. The client is expected to
test each feature in its environment and then report to the web server how many
authentic features are in the mixed set as the response to the challenge.
A real browser should be able to report the correct number of authentic features
to the web server after executing the challenge code, and thus passes the function
ality test. However, a clickbot would fail the test because it is unable to test the
features contained in the set and return the correct number. Considering some
untested browsers may not support some authentic features, we set up a narrow
range [x —-N, x] to handle this, where x is the expected number and A is a small
non-negative integer. A client is believed to pass the test as long as its reported
number falls within [x —N, x]. Here we set A to 4 based on our measurement results.
Evasion analysis. Assume th a t a client receives a mixed set of 150 features
from a web server and the set consists of 29 randomly selected authentic features
and 121 randomly selected bogus features. Thus, the expected number should fall
into the range [25,29]. Consider a crafty clickbot who knows about our detection
mechanism in advance. The clickbot does not need to test the features, but just
guesses a number from the possible range [0,150], and returns it to the server. In
this case, the probability for the guessed number to successfully fall into [25,29] is
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only 3%. Thus, the clickbot has little chance (3%) to bypass the functionality test.

2.2.3

B row sing behavior exam ination

Passing the functionality test cannot guarantee th at a click is valid. An advanced
clickbot may function like a real browser and thus can circumvent the functionality
test. A human clicker with a real browser can also pass the test.
However, clickbots and human clickers usually show quite different browsing
behaviors on the advertised website from those of real users. Click fraud activities
conducted by clickbots usually end up with loading the advertiser’s landing page and
do not show human behaviors on the site. For human clickers, their only purpose is
to make more money by clicking on ads as quickly as possible. They tend to browse
an advertised site quickly and then navigate away for the next click task. Instead,
real interested users tend to learn more about a product and spend more time on
the advertised site. They usually scroll up and down a page, click on their interested
links, browses multiple pages, and sometimes make a purchase.
Therefore, we leverage users’ browsing behaviors on the advertised site to detect
human clickers and advanced clickbots. Specifically, we extract extensive features
from passively collected browsing traffic on the advertised website, and train a clas
sifier for detection.

2.3

E x p e r im e n ta l R e su lts

In order to evaluate our approach, we run ad campaigns to collect real-world click
traffic, and then analyze the collected data to discern its primary characteristics,
resulting in a technique to classify click traffic as either fraudulent, casual, or valid.
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F igu re 2.4: A bait ad with the ad text of randomly selected English words

2.3.1

R unning ad cam paigns

To obtain real-world click traffic, we signed up with a major ad network and ran
ad campaigns for a high-traffic woodworking forum website. Motivated by the bait
ad technique proposed in [18], we created three bait ads for the site and made the
same assumption as the previous works [15, 16, 18], that very few people would
intentionally click on the bait ads and those ads are generally clicked by clickbots
and fraudulent human clickers. Bait ads are textual ads with nonsense content,
as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Note th at our bait ads were generated in English. In
addition, we created two normal ads, for which the ad texts describe the advertised
site exactly. Our goal of running ad campaigns is to acquire both malicious and
authentic click traffic for validating our click fraud detection system. To this end,
we set the bait ads to be displayed on partner websites of any language across
the world but display normal ads only on search result pages in English to avoid
publisher fraud cases from biasing the clicks on the latter normal ads. We expect
th a t most, if not all, clicks on bait ads and normal ads are fraudulent and authentic,
respectively.
We ran our ad campaigns for 10 days. Table 2.3 provides a summary of our ad
campaigns. Our ads had 2 million impressions2, received nearly 11 thousand clicks
and had a click-through rate (CTR) of 0.53% on average. Among these, 2.7 thousand
clicks were considered by the ad network as illegitimate and were not charged. The
2An ad being displayed once is counted as one impression.
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Set

C a m p a ig n C lic k s

I m p r e s s io n s C t R

In v a lid In v a lid
C lick s R a te
425
29.60%

1

b a itl
b ait 2

1,011

417,644

2

4,127

646,152

0.24%
0.64%

3

bait3

5,324

933,790

0.57%

4

normal 1

288

68,425

0.42%

5

normal2

224

20,784

1.08%

Total

NA

10,974

2,086,795

0.53%

2,760

852

17.11%

A vg.
CPC
$0.08
$0.03

$15.00

10

1,455

21.46%

$0.04

$15.00

10

18

5.88%

$0.40

$20.00

10

10

4.27%

$0.48

$20.00

10

25.15%

$0.06

$85.00

10

D a ily
B udget
$15.00

D u r a tio n
(d a y s )
10

Table 2.3: Summary of our ad campaigns
invalid click rate was 25.15%. The average cost per click (CPC) was $0.06. Note
th at the two normal ads only received 512 clicks accounting for 4.67% of the total.
The reason is th a t although we provided quite high bids for normal ads, our normal
ads still cannot compete with those of other advertisers for top positions and thus
received fewer clicks.

2.3.2

C haracterizing th e click traffic

We characterize the received click traffic by analyzing users’ geographic distribution,
browser type, IP address reputation, and referrer websites’ reputations. Our goal,
through statistical analysis, is to have a better understanding of both the users who
clicked on our ads and the referrer websites where our ads were clicked. Although
the ad network reported th a t our ads attracted close to 11 thousand clicks, we only
caught on the advertised site 9.9 thousand clicks, which serve as data objects for
both closer examination and validation of our approach.
G eographic d istrib u tion . We obtain users’ geographic information using an
IP geolocation lookup service [7]. Our 9.9 thousand clicks originate from 156 coun
tries. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of ad clicks by the top 10 countries which
generate the most clicks. The distribution of normal daily visitors to the advertised
site by country is also given in Figure 2.5. Note th at the data form “X / Y ” means
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of click traffic vs. th a t of normal traffic by country
th at X % of ad clicks and Y % of normal daily visitors are from th a t specific country.
The top 10 countries contribute 77.7% of overall clicks. China alone contributes
over 55% of the clicks, while the United States contributes 2.1%. This is quite un
usual because the normal daily visitors from China only account for 0.11% while
the normal visitors from the United States close to 76%. Like China, Egypt, Iraq,
and other generally non-English countries also contribute much higher shares of ad
click traffic than their normal daily traffic to the site. The publisher websites from
these countries are suspected to be using bots to click on our ads. Even worse, one
strategy of our ad network partner may aggravate the fraudulent activities. The
strategy says th a t when an ad has a high click through ratio on a publisher website,
the ad network will deliver the ad to th a t publisher website more frequently. To
guarantee th a t our ads attract as many clicks as possible within a daily budget, the
ad network may deliver our ads to those non-English websites more often.
B row ser ty p e. Next we examine the distribution of the browsers to see which
browser vendors are mostly used by users to view and click on our ads. We extracted
the browser information from the User-Agent strings of the H T TP requests to our
advertised website.
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F igu re 2.6: Distribution of click traffic by browser
Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of the browsers used by our ad clickers. IE,
Chrome, Firefox, Safari, and Opera are the top 5 desktop and laptop browsers,
which is consistent with the web browser popularity statistics from StatCounter [6].
Notably, mobile browsers alone contribute to nearly 50% of overall traffic, much
larger than the estim ated usage share of mobile browsers (about 18% [8]). Close
scrutinization reveals th a t 40% of the traffic with mobile browsers originates from
China. China generated over 50 percent of overall traffic, which skews the browser
distribution.
B lack lists. A fraction of our d ata could be generated by clickbots and compro
mised hosts. Those malicious clients could also be utilized by fraudsters to conduct
other undesirable activities, and are thus blacklisted. By looking up users’ IP ad
dresses in public IP blacklists [9], we found th a t 29% of the total hosts have ever
been blacklisted.
R eferrers. A nother interesting question would be which websites host our ads
and if their contents are really related to the keywords of our ads. According to the
contextual targeting policy of the ad network, an ad should be delivered to the ad
network’s partner websites whose contents match the selected keywords for the ad.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of click traffic by publisher
We used the Referer field in the H TTP request header to locate the publishers
th a t displayed our ads and then directed users to our advertised website. However,
we can only identify publishers for only 37.2% of the traffic (3,685 clicks) because the
remaining traffic either has a blank Referer field or has the domain of the ad network
as the referer field. For example, the Referer field for more than 40% of traffic has
the form of doubleclick.net. We then examined, among those detected publishers,
which websites contribute to the most clicks. Note th at publishers could be websites
or mobile apps. We identified 499 unique websites and 5 apps in total. Those apps
are all iPhone apps and only generate 28 clicks all together. The remaining 3,657
clicks are from the 499 unique websites. Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of the click
traffic by those 504 publishers. The top 3 websites with the most clicks on our ads
are all small game websites, which contribute to over 45% of publisher-detectable
clicks. Actually, the top 7 websites are all small game websites. Small game websites
often attra ct many visitors, and thus the ads on those websites are more likely to
be clicked on. However, our keywords are all woodworking-related and evidently,
the contents of those game websites do not m atch our keywords. According to
27

...........................................

120.00 %

99.10%

100.00% t

.. 900

■ % of clicks from the website w/o JavaScript support;
# of clicks from the website
* # of clicks from the website w/o JavaScript support :

853

100%
96.10%

9S.30%

700
84%
594

80.00%

600

69.4
462

60.00%

500
458

400

356

40.00%

300

36.30%

34.30%
192

200

122

20.00%

t

15.20%

86 86 ^79

9.40%

1

I:

0 .00%
cP'v

cP’’-

64
61

63

:

100

12

J 5""

cP '-

cPV

'F '

cP

vP

V "/
F igure 2.8: Percentage of clicks without JavaScript support for the top 10 publisher
websites contributing the most clicks
th e above mentioned contextual targeting policy, the ad network should have not
delivered our ads to such websites. One possible reason is th a t from the perspective
of the ad network, attracting clicks takes precedence over matching the ads with
host websites.

2.3.3

V alidating d etection approach

As described before, our approach is composed of three main components: a JavaScript
support and mouse event test, a functionality test, and a browsing behavior exami
nation. Here we individually validate their effectiveness.
JavaScript su p p ort and m ouse even t te st. Among the 9.9 thousand ad
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clicks logged by the advertised site, 75.2% of users do not support JavaScript. We
labelled those users as clickbots. Note th at this percentage may be slightly overesti
mated considering th a t some users (at most 2% [5]) may have JavaScript disabled.
In addition, those visits without support for JavaScript do not correlate with visits
from mobile browsers. We have checked th at nearly all mobile browsers provide sup
port for JavaScript despite limited computing power. We then focused on the top
10 publisher websites with the most clicks to identify potentially malicious publish
ers. Figure 2.8 depicts the percentage of clicks without script support from those
top 10 publishers. Among them, the two non-entertainment websites google.com
and ask.com have low ratios, 9.4% and 15.2%, respectively. In contrast, the other
8 entertainm ent websites have quite high click ratios without script support. There
are 86 visits from tvmao.com and none of them support JavaScript. We believe
th a t all 86 clicks are fraudulent and generated by bots. Similarly, 99.1% of clicks
from weaponsgames.com, 96.1% of clicks from 3dgames.org, and 95.3% from gamesgirl.net are w ithout JavaScript support either. Such high ratios indicate th at the
invalid click rate in the real-world ad campaigns is much larger than the average
invalid rate of 25.15% alleged by the ad network for our ad campaigns, as shown in
Table 2.3.
We observed 506 ad clicks (with JavaScript support) th at result in zero mouse
events when arriving at our target site.

Of those, 96 are initiated from mobile

platforms including iPad, iPhone, Android, and Windows Phone. The remaining
410 clicks are generated from desktop or laptop platforms. Those 410 ad clicks also
have few other kinds of user engagement: no mouse clicks, no page scrolls, and short
dwelling time. We labelled them as clickbots.
We further investigated the click traffic from 4399.com due to the fact th at this
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website generated the most clicks on our ads among all identified publishers. The
following several pieces of d ata indicate the existence of publisher fraud. First, all
853 clicks from 4399.com were generated within one day. Notably, up to 95 clicks
were generated within one hour. Second, several IPs were found to click on our
ads multiple tim es within one minute using the same User-Agent, and one UserAgent was linked to almost 15 clicks on average. Third, close to 70% of clients did
not support JavaScript. Hence we suspect th at the website owner used automated
scripts to generate fraudulent clicks on our ads.

However, the scripts are likely

incapable of executing the JavaScript code attached to our ads. In addition, they
probably spoofed IP address and User-Agent fields in the H T TP requests to avoid
detection.
F u n ctio n a lity te st.

The clickbots th a t cannot work as full-fledged modern

browsers are expected to fail our functionality test. Among the logged 9.9 thousand
clicks, 7,448 clicks without JavaScript support did not trigger the functionality test,
and 35 of the remaining clicks with JavaScript support were observed to fail the
functionality test and were subsequently labelled as clickbots.

So far, 75.6% of

clicks (7,483 clicks) had been identified by our detection mechanism to originate
from clickbots. Among them, 99.5% (7,448 clicks) were simple clickbots without
JavaScript support; and the rest 0.5% (35 clicks) were relatively advanced clickbots
with JavaScript support yet failed the functionality test.
B row sin g beh avior exam ination . After completing the two steps above and
discarding incomplete click data, 1,479 ad clicks (14.9 %) are left to be labelled.
Among them, 1,127 ad clicks are on bait ads while the other 352 clicks are on normal
ads.

Here we further classify the click traffic into three categories—fraudulent,

casual, and valid—based on user engagement, client IP, and publisher reputation
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information.
F ea tu res. We believe th at three kinds of features are effective to differentiate
advanced clickbots and human clickers from real users. (1) How users behave at the
advertised site, i.e., users’ browsing behavior information. (2) Who clicks on our
ads, and a host with a bad IP is more likely to issue fraudulent clicks. (3) Where
a user clicks on ads, and a click originating from a disreputable website tends to be
fraudulent. Table 2.4 enumerates all the features we extracted from each ad click
traffic to characterize users’ browsing behaviors on the advertised site.
F eatu re C a teg o r y

T F ea tu re D e sc r ip tio n
i # of to ta l clicks m ade on th e advertised site
Mouse clicks
i # of clicks made only on th e pages excluding th e landing page
_______________ # of clicks exclusively made on hyperlinks
# of scroll events in to tal
Mouse scrolls
# of scroll events made on th e pages excluding th e landing page
' # of mousemove events in to tal
Mouse moves
# of mousemove events made only on th e pages excluding th e landing page
Pages views
; # of pages viewed by a user
Visit duration_________ How long a user stays on th e site____________
Execution efficiency
C lient’s execution tim e of JavaS cript code for challenge_____________
Legitimacy of origin
If th e source IP is in any blacklist________________________________________________
Publisher’s reputation
If th e click originates from an disreputable website

Table 2.4: Features extracted for each ad click
G ro u n d tr u th . Previous works [18, 15, 16] all assume th at very few people
would intentionally click on bait ads and only clickbots and human clickers would
click on such ads. T h at is, a click on a bait ad is thought to be fraudulent. However,
this assumption is too absolute. Consider the following situation. A real user clicks
on a bait ad unintentionally or just out of curiosity, without malicious intention.
Then, the user happens to like the advertised products and begins browsing the
advertised site. In this case, the ad click generated by this user should not be
labelled as fraudulent. Thus, to minimize false positives, we partly accept the above
common assumption, scrutinize those bait ad clicks which have shown rich human
behaviors on the advertised site, and correct a-priori labels based on the following
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heuristics.

Specifically, for a bait ad click, if the host IP address is not in any

blacklist and the referrer website has a good reputation, this ad click is relabelled as
valid when one of the following conditions holds: (1) 30 seconds of dwelling time, 15
mouse events, and 1 click; (2) 30 seconds of dwelling time, 10 mouse events, 1 scroll
event, and 1 click; and (3) 30 seconds of dwelling time, 10 mouse events, and 2 page
views. We believe the above conditions are strict enough to avoid mislabelling the
ad clicks generated by bots and human clickers as valid clicks.
Note th at our normal ads are only displayed on the search engine result pages
with the expectation th a t most, if not all, clicks on normal ads are valid. The ad
campaign report provided by the ad network in Table 2.3 confirms this, showing that
the invalid click rate for normal ads is only 5.08% on average. Based on our design
and the ad campaign report, we basically assume th at the clicks on normal ads are
valid. However, after further manually checking the normal ad clicks, we found that
some of them do not demonstrate sufficient human behaviors, and these normal ad
clicks will be relabelled as casual when one of the following two conditions holds:
(1) less than 5 seconds of dwelling time; (2) less than 10 seconds of dwelling time
and less than 5 mouse events. The casual click traffic could be issued by human
users who unintentionally click on ads and then immediately navigate away from
the advertised site. From the advertisers’ perspective, such a click traffic does not
provide any value when evaluating the ROI of their ad campaigns on a specific ad
network, and therefore should be classified as casual.
Actually, if there is no financial transaction involved, only a user’s intention
m atters whether the corresponding ad click is fraudulent or not.

T hat is, only

users themselves know the exact ground tru th for fraudulent/valid/casual clicks.
For those clicks without triggering any financial transactions, we utilize the above
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Figure 2.9: Clients’ execution time of JavaScript challenge code in milliseconds
reasonable assumptions and straightforward heuristics to form the ground tru th for
fraudulent/valid/casual clicks.
E v a lu a tio n m e tr ic s . We evaluated our detection against two metrics—false
positive rate and false negative rate. A false positive is when a valid click is wrongly
labelled as fraudulent, and a false negative is when a fraudulent click is incorrectly
labelled as valid.
C la s s ific a tio n r e su lts.

Using Weka [10], we chose a C4.5 pruned decision

tree [24] with default param eter values (i.e., 0.25 for confidence factor and 2 for
minimum number of instances per leaf) as the classification algorithm, and ran a
10-fold cross-validation. The false positive rate and false negative rate were 6.1%
and 5.6%, respectively. Note th a t these are the classification results on those 1,479
unlabelled clicks. As a whole, our approach showed a high detection accuracy on
the total 9.9 thousand clicks, with a false positive rate of 0.79% and a false negative
rate of 5.6%, and the overall detection accuracy is 99.1%.
O verhead. We assessed the overhead induced by our detection on the client
and server sides, in terms of tim e delay, CPU, memory and storage usages.
The only extra work required of the client is the execution of a JavaScript chal-

lenge script and to report the functionality test results to the server as an AJAX
POST request. We measured the overhead on the client side using two metrics:
source lines of code (SLOC) and the execution time of JavaScript code.

The

JavaScript code is only about 150 SLOC and we observed negligible impact on
the client. We also estimated the client’s execution time of JavaScript from the
server side to avoid the possibility th at the client could report a bogus execution
time. Note th a t the execution time measured by the server contains a round trip
time, which makes the estimated execution tim e larger than the actual execution
time. Figure 2.9 depicts the 9.9 thousand clients’ execution time of the JavaScript
challenge code. About 80% of clients finished execution within one second. As
suming th at the round trip time (RTT) is 200 milliseconds, the actual computation
overhead incurred at the client side is merely several hundred milliseconds.
We used the SAR (System Activity Report) [11] to analyze server performance
and measure the overhead on the server side. We observed no spike in server load.
This is because most of work involved in our detection happens on the client side, and
the induced click-related traffic is insignificant in comparison with server’s normal
traffic.

2.4

D isc u ssio n and L im ita tio n s

In this project, we assume th at a clickbot typically does not include its own JavaScript
engine or access the full software stack of a legitimate web browser residing on the
infected host.

A sophisticated clickbot implementing a full browser agent itself

would greatly increase its presence and the likelihood of being detected. A clickbot
might also utilize a legitimate web browser to generate activities, and can thus pass
our browser functionality test. To identify such clickbots, we could further detect
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whether our ads and the advertised websites are really visible to users by utilizing
a new feature provided by some ad networks. The new feature allows advertisers
to instrum ent their ads with JavaScript code for a better understanding of what is
happening to their ads on the client side. W ith this feature, we could detect if our
ad iframe is visible at the client’s front-end screen rather than in the background,
and if it is really focused and clicked on.
In addition, compared to our user-visit related features (dwelling time, mouse
events, scroll events, clicks and etc.), user-conversation related features 3 are expected
to have better discriminating power between clickbots, human clickers, and real users
in browsing behaviors. However, our advertised site is a professional forum rather
than an online retailer. If a user registers (creates an account) on the forum, it is
analogous to a purchase a t an online retailer. However, such conversion from guest
to member is an event too rare to rely upon to enhance our classifier.

2.5

R e la te d W ork

B row ser fingerprinting. Browser fingerprinting allows a website to identify a
client browser even though the client disables cookies.

Existing browser finger

printing techniques could be mainly classified into two categories, based on the
information they need for fingerprinting. The first category fingerprints a browser
by collecting application-layer information, including H TTP request header infor
mation and system configuration information from the browser [17]. The second
category performs browser fingerprinting by examining coarse traffic generated by
the browsers [26]. However, both of them have their limitations in detecting click
bots. Nearly all the application-layer information can be spoofed by sophisticated
3Purchasing a product, abandoning an online cart, proactive online chat, etc.
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clickbots, and browser fingerprints may change quite rapidly over time [17]. In
addition, an advertiser often cannot collect enough traffic information for finger
printing the client from just one visit to the advertiser. Compared to the existing
browser fingerprinting techniques, our feature detection technique has three main
advantages. First, clickbots cannot easily pass the functionality test unless they
have implemented the main functionality present in modern browsers. Second, the
client’s functionality could be tested thoroughly at the advertiser’s side even though
the client visits the advertiser’s landing page only once. Lastly, our technique works
over time as new browsers appear because new browsers should also conform to the
those web standards currently supported by modern browsers.
R evealed click fraud. Several previous studies investigate known click fraud
activities, and clickbots have been found to be continuously evolving and become
more sophisticated. As the first study to analyze the functionality of a clickbot,
Daswani et al. [14] dissected Clickbot.A and found th at the clickbot could carry
out a low-noise click fraud attack to avoid detection. Miller et al. [23] examined
two other families of clickbots. They found th a t these two clickbots were more
advanced than Clickbot.A in evading click fraud detection. One clickbot introduces
indirection between bots and ad networks, while the other simulates human web
browsing behaviors. Some other characteristics of clickbots are described in [15].
Clickbots generate fraudulent clicks periodically and only issue one fraudulent click
in the background when a legitimate user clicks on a link, which makes fraudulent
traffic hardly distinguishable from legitimate click traffic. Normal browsers may also
be exploited to generate fraudulent click traffic. The traffic generated by a normal
browser could be hijacked by currently visited malicious publishers and be further
converted to fraudulent clicks [19]. Ghost click botnet [12] leverages DNS changer
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malware to convert a victim ’s local DNS resolver into a malicious one and then
launches ad replacement and click hijacking attacks.

Our detection can identify

each of these clickbots by actively performing a functionality test and can detect all
other kinds of click fraud by examining their browsing behavior traffic on the server
side.
Click fraud d etection . Metwally et al. conducted an analysis on ad networks’
traffic logs to detect publishers’ non-coalition hit inflation fraud [21 ], coalition fraud
[20], and duplicate clicks [22]. The main limitation of these works lies in th at ad
networks’ traffic logs are usually not available to advertisers. Haddadi in [18] and
Dave et al. in [15] suggested th at advertisers use bait ads to detect fraudulent clicks
on their ads. While bait ads have been proven effective in detection, advertisers
have to spend extra money on those bait ads. Dave et al. [16] presented an ap
proach to detecting fraudulent clicks from an ad network’s perspective rather than
an advertiser’s perspective. Li et al. [19] introduced the ad delivery path related
features to detect malicious publishers and ad networks. However, monitoring and
reconstructing the ad delivery path is time-consuming and difficult to detect click
frauds in real time. Schulte et al. [25] detected client-side malware using so-called
program interactive challenge (PIC) mechanism. However, an intermediate proxy
has to be introduced to examine all H TTP traffic between a client and a server,
which would inevitably incur significant delay. Like [18, 15], our defense works at
the server side but does not cause any extra cost for advertisers. Our work is the first
to detect clickbots by testing their functionalities against the specifications widely
conformed to by modern browsers. Most clickbots can be detected at this step,
because they have either no such functionalities or limited functionalities compared
to modern browsers. For the advanced clickbots and human clickers, we scrutinize

37

their browsing behaviors on the advertised site, extract effective features, and train
a classifier to identify them.

2.6

C o n clu sio n

In this project, we have proposed a new approach for advertisers to independently
detect click fraud activities issued by clickbots and human clickers. Our proposed
detection system performs two main tasks of proactive functionality testing and
passive browsing behavior examination. The purpose of the first task is to detect
clickbots.

It requires a client to actively prove its authenticity of a full-fledged

browser by executing a piece of JavaScript code. For more sophisticated clickbots
and human clickers, we fulfill the second task by observing what a user does on the
advertised site. Moreover, we scrutinize who initiates the click and which publisher
website leads the user to the advertiser’s site, by checking the legitimacy of the
clients’ IP addresses (source) and the reputation of the referring site (intermediate),
respectively. We have implemented a prototype and deployed it on a large produc
tion website for performance evaluation. We have then run a real ad campaign for
the website on a major ad network, during which we characterized the real click
traffic from the ad campaign and provided advertisers a better understanding of ad
click traffic, in terms of geographical distribution and publisher website distribution.
Using the real ad campaign data, we have demonstrated th at our detection system
is effective in the detection of click fraud.
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C hapter 3
E -com m erce R ep u tation
M anipulation: T he E m ergence of
R ep u tation -E scalation-as-a-Service
In this chapter, we present our study on a newly emerging underground industry,
so called SRE markets, in which a potentially unbounded number of inexpensive
human laborers are hired by e-commerce sellers to conduct fake purchases for repu
tation inflation. By fake purchases, we mean purchases th a t although they appear
legitimate and complete as far as the online system is concerned, no real product
or at most an empty package is delivered by the seller. This approach is far more
elaborate and much more difficult, if not infeasible, to detect because the buyer ap
pears to have genuinely purchased the product as opposed to just leaving a review
or score for the product and the seller. Moreover, multiple individuals th at do not
know each other are involved in the process.
To provide an empirical analysis of the prevalence of the SRE markets, in this
project, we answer some quantitative and qualitative questions about their current
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operations and structure: How popular are SRE markets with online sellers? W hat
strategies have SRE markets forged for online sellers to evade fake transaction detec
tion in online marketplaces? W hat kind of online sellers are involved in this shadowy
ecosystem? How active are sellers on SRE markets? W hat is their actual effective
ness? Has the sellers’ reputation been escalated as a result? W hat is the worker
population? How much can a worker earn daily? W hat amount of fake-transaction
volumes is handled by SRE markets monthly? How much revenue is generated by
them each month? Are there any opportunities for disrupting the value chain of the
black economy?
We organize the chapter as follows. Section 3.1 provides a brief introduction to
Taobao and an overview of the business model of SRE markets. Section 3.2 describes
our d ata collection methodology and d ata we collected. Section 3.3 presents the
results from our infiltration of five SRE markets and our insights into the shadowy
business. We evaluate the effectiveness of SRE services in Section 3.4, and discuss
possible defensive interventions and limitations in Section 3.5. We revisit the SRE
ecosystem one year later and present our new findings in Section 3.6. We review the
related work in Section 3.7, followed by our conclusions in Section 3.8.

3.1

B a ck g ro u n d

The increasingly thriving e-commerce has drawn forth a large number of online
sellers.

For instance, eBay, the online marketplace giant, has 25 million sellers

globally [28]. SRE markets have emerged to satisfy online sellers’ demands for high
reputation. We identified five SRE markets which provide SRE services exclusively
to online sellers on the Taobao marketplace. In this section, we first briefly introduce
the Taobao online marketplace and then provide an overview of how a typical SRE
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market works.

3.1.1

Taobao O verview

Taobao, launched by Alibaba Group [29] in 2003, is the largest consumer-to-consumer
(C2C) online marketplace in China with more than 8.5 million sellers, over one bil
lion product listings, and around 500 million registered users as of March 2015
[30, 31]. Taobao has achieved great success with 60 million daily visitors and 50,000
sales per minute, and is ranked 9th globally by Alexa [32] as of this writing. In 2013,
the total gross merchandise traded on Alibaba was more than Amazon and eBay’s
gross sales combined [33].
To facilitate shopping on Taobao, Alibaba operates Alipay and AliWangWang.
Alipay serves as an online payment system which provides escrow services for buyers
— holding buyer’s payment until the buyer is happy with the goods received. Ali
WangWang is an embedded instant messaging program, commonly used for Taobao
buyers to communicate with sellers prior to the purchase.
The great success of Taobao makes it an ideal host for miscreants such as the op
erators of SRE markets, which accumulate wealth by providing reputation-escalation
services to Taobao sellers. Though not yet reported, the other major online market
places such as Amazon and eBay may also suffer from fake transactions conducted
through SRE markets.

3.1.2

H ow a T ypical SRE M arket W orks

SRE markets operate in the crowdsourcing mode and are at the center of the shad
owy ecosystem, which connects insincere online sellers who desire for high reputation
with people who want to earn extra money. However, unlike other crowdsourcing
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F igure 3.1: Lifecycle of a fake-purchase task on the SRE market.
markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [42], these SRE markets only
accommodate one kind of task: conducting fake transactions on the specified Taobao
stores. According to the terminology used on crowdsourcing markets, online sellers
on SRE markets act as task requesters while people undertaking fake-purchase tasks
act as task workers.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a typical lifecycle of a fake-purchase task on a SRE market.
We classify the lifecycle into five distinct stages: task creation, task undertaken,
conducting fake purchase on Taobao, order fulfillment, and commission realization.
Task C reation. The lifecycle of a fake-purchase task begins with an online
seller creating a task on the SRE market. To this end, the seller must first deposit
money into the SRE market at the amount equivalent to the sum of the goods’
value designated in the task and the commission fee calculated by the SRE market
(S tep 1). Then, the seller creates a task and customizes an associated qualification
requirement to limit which workers are qualified to undertake this task (S tep 2).
Q ualification R equirem ent. The qualification requirement is composed of
several qualification types predefined by an SRE market. Table 3.1 lists the quali
fication types provided by an SRE market. Each one describes a qualification th at
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Q u a lifica tio n T y p e s
Q l : T he worker m ust have an am ount of guaranteed money held by th e SRE m arket.
Q 2: T he Taobao account used by th e worker for taking tasks m ust be verified and pre-aged.
Q 3: T he worker’s Taobao account m ust not be used a lot for fake purchases on the SRE m arket.
Q 4: T he worker should be proficient, reflected by her score value on th e SRE m arket.
Q 5: T he worker should be located in th e geographic region specified in th e task.
Q6= T he worker never undertakes prior tasks posted by this seller._______________________________________

T able 3.1: Qualification types
a worker must have in order to take on the task and is believed to help the seller
reduce the risk of being penalized by Taobao for fake transactions. Qualification
Q l requires a worker to have an amount of money held by the SRE market in case
a dishonest worker intentionally complains about the seller to Taobao and requests
a refund for her purchase even though she gets rewarded for making the fake pur
chase. Q2 requires the Taobao buyer account used by the worker for undertaking
tasks to be verified and pre-aged1, which allows the seller to evade simple detection
heuristics used by Taobao for suspending freshly minted accounts based on weak
signs of misbehavior. Q3 requires the worker’s Taobao account to not get involved
in too many fake purchases because such accounts are probably being closely moni
tored by Taobao. Q4 requires a worker to be familiar with the task flow. Q5 makes
the requirement for workers’ geographical distribution represented by IP address to
make the fake purchase appear more real. Q 6 reflects the seller’s effort to diversify
the workers to avoid triggering any Taobao alarms.
Task U n d ertak en . In light of the qualification requirements, a professional
worker usually has several pre-aged Taobao accounts on hand and takes turns using
them to avoid using one account too often. The demand for Taobao accounts has
inspired another service provided by SRE markets. Each SRE market serves as an
1Pre-aged Taobao account refers to the account that has been created for some time and ever
used for real purchases.
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account merchant that stockpiles a m ultitude of Taobao accounts and can sell them
to workers at a whim. The prices for Taobao accounts range from $0.2 to $0.5 each
depending on the account’s age and purchase history. After purchasing a specific
number of Taobao accounts from the SRE market (S tep 3), the worker chooses a
qualified task to work on (Step 4).
C la ss
G oods
Commission
Browsing behavior

P aym ent m ethod
Shipping address
Confirmation & reviews

D e ta il
T ype (physical or v irtual), Selling price
Commission fee offered for this task
Search first on Taobao by the keywords given, random ly choose three other
stores to browse before finally entering th e seller’s store.
Like th e store and add it to favorites.
Stay on th e page for 5 m inutes and scroll down to th e bottom before adding
to cart.
Feign chat with the seller via T aobao’s built-in IM program AliWangWang.
T he worker pays either for herself or using th e e-Gift card provided by the
seller.
Use th e shipping address designated by th e seller for the order placed.
Confirm th e delivery and leave good ratings and positive reviews after a pre
defined w aiting time.

Table 3.2: A typical task description
C on d u ctin g Fake P u rchase on Taobao. After attaching a Taobao account
to the task, the worker first starts chatting with the seller posting the task through
a third-party Instant Messaging (IM) program on the SRE site. After further check
ing the worker’s Taobao account against the qualification requirements, the seller
instructs the worker to follow the task description and behave like a real buyer on
Taobao (Step 5). Table 3.2 enumerates a typical task description. It describes the
type of goods to purchase (physical or virtual), its selling price, and the commission
fee offered. It also details the required browsing behaviors on Taobao before check
ing out, the payment method, shipping address, as well as the timing for delivery
confirmation and leaving positive reviews.
O rder Fulfillm ent. After finishing all the required actions listed in the task
description, the worker gets to the checkout step and provides payment to Taobao’s
escrow-based system Alipay using either her own form of allowed payment or the
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e-Gift card provided by the seller (Step 6). Then the seller arranges to fulfill the
order. For virtual goods such as software and prepaid phone cards, the order is
directly fulfilled via the Internet, and the worker is required to confirm the receipt
and leave good ratings immediately after checkout.

For physical goods such as

clothes, the seller never ships out the ordered goods but is required by Taobao to
provide a mail tracking label for package tracking. To evade detection, for each task
with physical goods, the seller purchases one express mail tracking label from the
SRE market a t a price of $0.4-0.7, depending on the shipment companies (Step 7).
SRE markets usually partner with shipment companies to get a stable supply of
fresh and unscanned express tracking labels. W ith the label purchased, the seller
inputs the label number into Taobao and hence fulfills the order (Step 8). Some
sellers may ship an empty package to the designated shipping address while most
ship nothing.
C om m ission R ealization . After a predefined wait time elapses, the worker
confirms the receipt of the goods on Taobao (Step 9). In addition, the worker
must rate th e seller with a full score and write positive reviews with the contents
either specified in the task description or composed by the worker. Then the worker
requests Alipay to release money from her Alipay account to the seller’s Alipay
account (S tep 10). Subsequently, the seller notifies the SRE market to release the
money pre-deposited on the market when posting the task to the worker (Step
11). Upon request, the SRE market withholds a portion (typically 20%) of the
commission fee offered for the task and then releases the remaining money (the
remaining 80% commission fee, along with the reimbursement if the worker paid for
the goods w ith her own money) to the worker (Step 12). To this point, the lifecycle
of a typical fake-purchase task is completed.
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F igu re 3.2: Procedure of data collection.
In summary, the worker typically needs a verified and aged Taobao account,
invests several minutes and tens of US dollars in purchasing goods, and gets a
reward of several dollars after about 3 days; the seller needs to purchase an express
mail tracking label if the goods in the task is physical and pays a small commission
fee in return for accumulating a transaction and a good rating (review); the SRE
market earns money from each task by withholding a part of the commission fee,
selling mailing labels to sellers and Taobao accounts to workers. In the lifecycle of a
task, two escrow-based payment services — Taobao’s Alipay and the SRE m arket’s
payment system — play a key role in guaranteeing th a t the worker completes all
required actions to earn the commission and th at the seller pays a commission fee
to the worker for the fake transaction.

3.2

D a ta C o lle c tio n M e th o d o lo g y

In this section, we describe our crawling mechanism and summarize the dataset,
followed by a discussion on ethical concerns.

3.2.1

C raw ling M echanism

Figure 3.2 briefly illustrates the procedure of our data collection. First, we iden
tify SRE markets (I). Then web crawlers are developed to automatically crawl the
identified SRE markets for task postings and the profiles of users (i.e., sellers and
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workers) on the SRE markets (II). In order to recognize those sellers’ IDs on the
Taobao marketplace, we manually undertake tasks for one month (III). For those
sellers with their Taobao IDs recognized, we then crawl Taobao for their sales and
reputation information to evaluate the impact th a t their acquisition of both trans
actions and feedbacks conducted through the SRE markets have upon their Taobao
stores (IV). Note th at steps I and III are manual operations and the others are
fully autom ated. We detail these steps as follows.
Identifyin g SR E M arkets. SRE markets usually advertise themselves to at
tract new Taobao sellers and workers through online social networks, public forums,
IM group chat, search engines, etc. We investigated these common haunts and iden
tified five SRE markets in total. They are SKY [34], WOOD [35], EM PIRE [36],
COOL [37], and NET [38]. All five markets have nearly identical web layout and
source code. Whois domain lookup reveals th at they have been founded for two to
four years. We do not claim th at our study covers all SRE markets, which is very
challenging if not impossible. However, we believe th at the five SRE markets we
studied represent a reasonable coverage since they are some of the most active and
popular SRE markets.
C raw ling SR E M arkets. In early February 2014, we first registered an account
on each market, then performed a few test crawls, and finally developed autom ated
crawlers which exploit the cookies stored locally by SRE markets to bypass their
CAPTCHA mechanisms and login prompts. During the two months from February
21, 2014 to April 21, 2014, we conducted a comprehensive crawl of the five chosen
SRE markets. Our crawled data includes task postings and the profiles of both
sellers and workers on the SRE markets.
In an attem pt to record all task postings, we had to crawl the SRE markets
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continuously 24-hours/7-days because a task may immediately become invisible once
undertaken by a worker. A task posting specifies what kind of workers are qualified
for the task (see Table 3.1 for a list of qualification types) and provides a detailed
description of the task including the goods involved, its price, commission fee offered,
browsing behaviors required, payment method, and many more listed in Table 3.2.
From the collected task postings, we extracted the involved sellers’ usernames on
a SRE market and further employed the application programming interface (API)
provided by the SRE market to crawl once daily for the sellers’ profiles on the
market. A profile mainly contains the number of tasks ever posted on the market
by the seller and when th e seller first and last posted tasks. However, the publicly
accessible worker-related d ata is only restricted to a list of the top 10 workers on
each market, which is published and daily updated as an excitation mechanism. We
crawled once daily for the list of the top 10 workers and further collected their profile
information. A worker’s profile includes the total number of tasks undertaken, as
well as the first and the last time to undertake a task.
U n d ertak in g Tasks. In order to examine the impact th at a seller’s posting
fake-purchase tasks on a SRE market has upon her online store in the Taobao mar
ketplace, we have to figure out the corresponding Taobao ID of the SRE seller. We
soon realized th a t only undertaking her task postings allows us to record her Taobao
ID. Unfortunately, we cannot recognize a seller’s associated Taobao ID unless we
undertake her tasks manually. To undertake a task, a Taobao account is required
and we used our own legitimate Taobao account. During the month between Febru
ary 21, 2014 and March 21, 2014, we conducted numerous attem pts to undertake
a task and then abort the task immediately after the associated Taobao seller ID
is recorded. In this way, we were able to identify more than 4,000 Taobao seller
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IDs. We failed to identify more seller IDs because either our Taobao account, SRE
market account, or geographic IP does not satisfy the qualification requirements of
many tasks.
Craw ling Taobao.

W ith the identified Taobao seller IDs, we were able to

monitor the daily variation in transaction volume and reputation of each of those
Taobao stores. To this end, we developed another web crawler and employed the API
provided by Taobao to crawl Taobao once daily for those sellers’ profile information.
A seller’s profile on Taobao mainly contains the following information: her seller
ID, the major business she runs, the store start date, the current store reputation
score, the transaction volume in the recent week (month, semi-year, and year), and
customers’ rate.
We took a similar recipe as in [47] to make sure our continuous crawl was not no
ticed by both SRE market operators and Taobao marketplace. Specifically, neither
our IP nor accounts on SRE markets were blocked during the period of measurement.
Also, we were not contacted by any operator or Taobao to inquire about our brows
ing activities. So, we believe th a t our crawled d ata is valid and not tainted by SRE
market operators. W ith the collected d ata from SRE markets and Taobao, we were
able to examine the SRE market characteristics, evaluate the impact of SRE ser
vices upon Taobao stores, and offer insights for designing a robust fake-transaction
detection mechanism.

3.2.2

D ata Sum m ary

Table 3.3 summarizes the dataset collected on the five SRE markets we infiltrated.
Specifically, it enumerates the measurement period, the total number of task post
ings, the number of active sellers, and the number of sellers with Taobao IDs suc
49

cessfully identified. As a result of the two-month collection of the five SRE markets,
we collected 219,165 tasks in total, contributed by 11,130 Taobao sellers. Of them,
4,162 sellers’ Taobao IDs were identified through our manually undertaking tasks
for one month.
M ark et
SKY
WOOD
EMPIRE
COOL
NET
Total

P e r io d
02/21-04/21
02/21-04/21
02/21-04/21
03/07-04/21*
02/21-04/21
—

A c tiv e S ellers
T a sk P o s ts
2,789
63,343
54,824
2,968
48,120 :
2,016
2,419
39,823 1
938
13,055
11,130
219,165

Id en tified S ellers
1,332
1,232
706
657
235
4,162

Table 3.3: List of the SRE markets we infiltrated, the months monitored, total
task postings, active sellers during the time frame, and Taobao ID identified sellers.
*This market went down between 02/21 and 03/06.

A comparison of Taobao seller IDs across the five markets shows th at 52 of 4,162
sellers posted tasks on more than one SRE markets. Excluding the overlapping
seller IDs, we identified 4,109 unique Taobao seller IDs altogether.

3.2.3

E thical C onsiderations

In our study, we identified sellers’ Taobao IDs by manually undertaking tasks. We
emphasize th a t we did not purchase or register any fraudulent Taobao accounts
but used our own legitimate Taobao accounts to undertake tasks. Furthermore, we
never completed a single task but aborted a task immediately after we recorded the
seller’s Taobao ID. Thus, we did not participate in fake transactions and strictly
abided by Taobao’s terms and policies. In addition, we did not expose any Taobao
IDs identified in this project, and all d ata crawled from SRE markets and Taobao
is publicly available. Therefore, our work will not introduce any additional risk to
SRE market operators or their sellers.
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3.3

S R E M arket C h a ra cteristics

Now we present our measurement results of the five SRE markets. We first examine
the popularity of SRE markets. Then we investigate the strategies formulated by
SRE markets to circumvent Taobao’s detection of fake transactions. Next we char
acterize two key players on SRE markets: sellers and workers. Finally, we estimate
the generated gross revenue and the total fake-transaction volume handled by the
five SRE markets during our two-month monitoring.

3.3.1

SRE M arket P opularity
D a ily n ew ta sk s
D a ily a c tiv e sellers
A vg.
M ax
A vg.
M ax
M ark et
1481
313 ’ 951
SKY
' 224
1132
297
WOOD
381
816
1035
222
689
EMPIRE
310
517 i
663
1843
COOL ! 233
138
276
NET
59
102

T im e t o u n d e r ta k e (se co n d s)
M in
A vg.
2
230
1
260
243
1
2
95
1
288

Table 3.4: Statistics of daily active sellers, daily new tasks, and the time to under
take a task on the five SRE markets.

We first attem pt to measure how attractive SRE markets are to Taobao sellers,
in terms of daily active sellers, daily task postings, and how fast a task is undertaken.
By active sellers we mean those sellers who post at least one task on a specific day.
Table 3.4 lists the statistics of these metrics for each of the five SRE markets. All
five markets but NET have more than 200 active sellers per day on average, and
as many as 517 active sellers can be observed on the COOL market on a single
day. In addition, hundreds of new tasks are posted every day on each market, and
the average number of new tasks on the SKY market has almost reached 1,000 per
day. The peak number of new daily tasks is observed on the COOL market, with
1,843 posts. Moreover, a newly posted task is usually undertaken very quickly. The
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average time for a new task to be undertaken is less than 300 seconds (5 minutes)
on all five markets. It is even faster on the COOL market at less than 2 minutes
on average. The minimum time for new tasks to be undertaken is within 2 seconds.
All these results indicate th a t SRE markets serve as popular distributors for fake
transactions targeting the Taobao marketplace.

3.3.2

Strategies to Evade Taobao D etection

The high popularity of SRE markets among Taobao sellers benefits from those sell
ers’ confidence th a t they will not be detected or penalized by Taobao for fake trans
actions, or at least the risk is quite low. Indeed, all five markets provide a set of
similar guidelines for sellers to follow when posting tasks in order to circumvent
Taobao’s detection system. Next we investigate Taobao’s detection mechanism and
SRE m arkets’ tit-for-tat strategies.
The details about the implementation of Taobao’s detection algorithm are not
publicly available, but many param eters have been learned from previous penalty
from Taobao posed for fake transactions. The detection mechanism is believed to
cover all steps in a purchase transaction.
R e s tr ic t io n
IVA & Aged ~
Use Frequency

SKY W OOD
7.48 ~
17.65
15.26
36.78

E M PIR E
21.99
38.47

COOL
23.22
39.97

N ET
10.98
23.20

Table 3.5: Fraction (%) of tasks with restrictions on workers’ Taobao accounts.

T aobao B u yer A cco u n ts.

According to Taobao’s report, more than 90%

of registered Taobao buyer accounts are ID-verified accounts (IVAs).

Non-IVA

accounts and newly registered ones would receive special attention. In addition,
Taobao buyer accounts with too many purchases within a short time may have been
put in some gray lists by Taobao for close monitoring. A Taobao store with a large
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portion of transactions from non-IVA accounts, newly generated accounts, or ac
counts in gray lists would become a suspect of fake transactions. Correspondingly,
SRE markets have restricted the number of tasks each Taobao buyer account can
undertake per day to be less than six. Also, Taobao sellers on SRE markets can
enforce extra restrictions on Taobao buyer accounts. Table 3.5 lists the fraction
of tasks w ith restrictions on Taobao accounts among the total 215,292 tasks we
crawled. Note th at on the COOL market, 23.22% of tasks require th at the workers’
Taobao buyer accounts must be IVA and pre-aged, and about 40% have restrictions
on the frequency th at a worker’s Taobao account can be used to undertake tasks.
R e s tr ic t io n
Geographic dist.
D esignated SA

SKY
0.59
10.09

W O OD
E M PIR E
9.89
1.87
19.72________8.03

COOL
3.92
7.68

N ET
1.44
12.17

Table 3.6: Fraction (%) of tasks with geographic preference and shipping address
(SA) designated.

G eographic D istrib u tio n & Shipping A ddress. W ithout a diverse pool of
IP addresses and shipping addresses, fake transactions could be easily spotted by
Taobao’s detection system. To avoid detection, workers on SRE markets are required
to change IP addresses and clean up browser cookies between’two consecutive tasks.
In addition, Taobao sellers can also set geographical preferences of the workers
or require workers to fill in the shipping addresses of sellers’ choice to make fake
transactions appear geographically distributed. Table 3.6 shows the fractions of
tasks with geographic preference and shipping addresses (SA) designated. It shows
th a t a small portion of tasks have restrictions on geographic distribution or shipping
address, which is reasonable considering th at workers on the crowdsourcing platform
have already been very diverse.
Im ita tin g a R eal P urchase on Taobao. In addition to buyers’ Taobao ac
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counts, IP, and shipping addresses, their browsing behaviors throughout the pur
chase are also closely monitored. To im itate a real purchase, the majority of tasks
on SRE markets require workers to show some of the following actions. ( 1 ) Search
to enter: Search on Taobao for the designated goods with given keywords and lo
cate the seller’s store; randomly choose three other stores to browse first and then
enter the seller’s store. (2) Browse the store-. Browse several other goods first, then
browse the designated goods page; scroll down to the bottom of the page and stay
five minutes. (3) Like the store: Add the store to favorites. (4) Start a fake chat:
Talk with the seller via Taobao’s built-in IM tool AliWangWang. Finally check out
the goods. Table 3.7 summarizes the fraction of tasks with the required actions.
Clearly, a large portion of tasks on SRE markets require workers to show at least
one kind of browsing behavior of a real buyer. For instance, more than 73% of
tasks on all five markets require workers to present at least one of the four actions.
And “search to enter” is the most required actions. More than 47% of tasks on all
five markets require the workers to enter the stores by first searching on Taobao
with given keywords. Our results indicate th a t SRE markets have paid significant
attention to evading human behavior based detection. Thus, defenders should not
rely on only one kind of human behavior and should combine human behaviors with
other features for accurate detection.
R e q u ir e m e n t
Search to enter
Browse th e store
Like th e store
Fake chat
One or more

SKY
66.80
17.69
42.41
33.32
79.46

W OOD
51.81
17.11
30.25
43.65
73.99

E M PIR E
53.43
41.14
27.85
34.06
80.33

COOL
68.34
28.42
27.23
41.21
81.80

N ET
47.38
54.31
28.21
41.48
82.61

Table 3.7: Fraction (%) of tasks with requirements for each kind of browsing
behavior before checking out. “One or more” denotes the tasks with at least one
required action.

P a y m en t. When checking out, a worker pays for the ordered products with
54

either an e-Gift card provided by the seller or her own debit card. Credit card
payment is usually not recommended on SRE markets to prevent insincere workers
from disputing a credit card refund after completing the task. Tasks with e-Gift
payment are often undertaken quickly due to no need of monetary investment. Table
3.8 lists the fractions of tasks with the requirements for e-Gift payment and no credit
card payment. It is clear th a t tasks with e-Gift card payment are quite limited,
which is reasonable since too many transactions with e-Gift payment on a store
may trigger alarm. Also, as expected, tasks with a declaration of no credit card
payment are limited, as well. One possible explanation is th a t credit card payment
is not very popular in China, and sellers try to avoid credit card dispute issues. This
observation indicates th a t most workers pay with their debit cards.
R e q u ir e m e n t
e-G ift paym ent
No credit card

SKY
0
4.73

W OOD
0.27
2.32

E M PIR E
6.12
0

COOL
0
0

NET"
0.59
0

T a b le 3.8: Fraction (%) of tasks with requirements for e-Gift card payment or no
credit card payment.

Shipping. Taobao monitors package tracking information as well. For each
transaction involving physical goods, a seller needs to submit one package tracking
number to Taobao for buyer tracking. To create a fake illusion of shipment, a seller
purchases a tracking label from an SRE market and submits the tracking number
to Taobao. However, no real product or at most an empty package is delivered by
the seller. Table 3.9 shows the fraction of tasks declaring to ship empty packages.
We found th a t most tasks ship nothing to buyers, which means a fake tracking
number is enough to avoid detection. This may be because it’s difficult for online
marketplaces to verify the shipment of a package since goods are usually delivered
using third-party shipping services.
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R eq u irem en t
Em pty package

SKY WOOD
EMPIRE
COOL NET
6.87______2.02__________ 0________0______ 0

Table 3.9: Fraction (%) of tasks declaring shipment of empty package.

02/21

02/27

03/06

03/12

03/19

03/25

04/01

04/07

04/14

04/21

Date

Figure 3.3: A breakdown of when to confirm the receipt. Numbers in parentheses
in the legend denote the fraction of the total 219,165 tasks crawled on the five SRE
markets.
R eceip t C onfirm ation and W riting P o sitiv e R eview s. The last step to
complete an online purchase is to confirm the receipt and write reviews. For workers
on SRE markets, they must give the highest scores and leave positive reviews. The
wait time for receipt confirmation is specified in each task and has nine possible
values: immediately, 30 minutes, 1 day, 2 days, 3 days, 4 days, 5 days, 6 days,
and 7 days. Figure 3.3 shows a breakdown of wait time of the total 219,165 tasks
crawled on the five SRE markets. More than 50% of tasks require workers to confirm
the receipt two to four days after placing the order with an attem pt to match the
typical shipping speed. Slightly more than a quarter of tasks require immediate
confirmation of receipt, and a close scrutiny indicates th at nearly all of them are
tasks with virtual goods, which is reasonable due to no need for shipping.
P reparation for A p p eal to Taobao again st P en alization . Although elab-

56

R e q u ir e m e n t
Email & phone
Confirm on AliW.
G uarantee $

SKY
1.16
11.65
19.10

W OOD
2.42
0
5.13

EM PIRE
0.26
0
1.26

COOL
1.56
0
23.96

N ET
0.02
1.97
4.21

Table 3.10: Fraction (%) of tasks requiring leaving email address and phone num
ber, confirmation on AliWangWang, and guarantee money.

orately conducted, a fake purchase may still be detected, and the sellers involved
may be penalized by Taobao. However, sellers have the right to appeal against
penalties by presenting evidence of real transactions. Although an express track
ing label usually serves as strong evidence, to collect more evidence, some sellers
require task workers to leave their phone numbers or email addresses in the placed
orders. Some workers are also required to confirm the receipt of goods on other
channels like AliWangWang. Moreover, to prevent malicious workers from report
ing fake transactions to Taobao after getting rewarded, some tasks require workers
to have guarantee money held by SRE markets. Table 3.10 lists the fractions of
tasks with each of these requirements. Although only a small portion of tasks have
these requirements, they reflect the sophistication of SRE markets against Taobao
detection.

3.3.3

E ffectiveness o f SR E M arkets’ Evasion Strategies

SRE market operators have developed sophisticated strategies to evade Taobao’s
fake transaction detection mechanism. Thus, it is quite interesting to check how
those evasion strategies are effective against Taobao’s hidden detection mechanism.
Specifically we evaluate their effectiveness by examining what percentage of those
4,109 Taobao sellers who involved in fake transactions with their Taobao IDs being
identified were ever penalized by Taobao in the two-month period, during which we
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monitored these sellers’ reputation growth on the Taobao marketplace2. We first
describe Taobao’s punitive measures on merchant misconducts and then present our
observation of the penalties suffered by SRE sellers for conducting fake transactions.

3.3.3.1

T aobao’s P u n itiv e M easures

Taobao takes different punitive measures based on the seriousness of misconduct.
Its major penalties are described as follows: (I) remove the transaction volume,
reputation score, and customer reviews generated by a fake transaction; (II) demote
the involved stores by lowering their rankings in Taobao search results; (III) take the
involved products off shelves and do not display them on the Taobao marketplace for
specific days; (IV) ban the stores from future advertising and promotion campaigns;
(V) deduct penalty points from the involved stores’ reputation scores; (VI) zero a
store’s reputation score; and (VII) (permanently) shut down the involved stores.
The penalties VI and VII represent the two most severe penalties. Note th at the
above penalties may be imposed individually or jointly.

3.3.3.2

P en a lties Im p osed on SR E Sellers

Although we were able to monitor the daily variation in store reputation for each
of the 4,109 Taobao sellers, we cannot observe the effect of the penalties I, II, III,
or IV imposed on a Taobao store from outside. Thus, our findings may inevitably
underestim ate Taobao’s crackdown on fake transactions.
We focus on the three most severe and also observable penalties V, VI, and VII
imposed on the SRE sellers by the Taobao marketplace. The penalty V is regarded
2Although the manual collection of the 4,109 sellers’ Taobao IDs was completely done on March
21, 2014, we began monitoring the already identified sellers’ reputation changes on the Taobao
marketplace once daily as early as February 21, 2014 and finished monitoring on April 21, 2014.
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utation points of the 932 Taobao sellers beginning posting fake-transaction tasks
suffering from the penalty V.
on SREs.
to be imposed on a Taobao store if the store’s reputation score decreases compared
with th e day before. The argument is th at a Taobao store’s reputation is supposed
to monotonically increase with the time unless the penalty V is imposed. A Taobao
store is considered to suffer from the penalty VI if the store’s reputation score is
zeroed one day. A Taobao store is undergoing the penalty VII if our search for the
store in the Taobao search engine continuously returns information showing that
the store does not exist anymore before we ended our monitoring on April 21 , 2014.
We examined each SRE store’s reputation changes and its presence to spot any
signs of the penalties V, VI, and VII imposed by Taobao. Among the 4,109 identified
Taobao sellers, 932 (22.7%) sellers were observed to suffer from the penalty V, i.e.,
with points deducted from their reputation scores.

89 (2.2%) sellers underwent

the two heaviest penalties VI and VII. More specifically, 9 stores had their store
reputations zeroed and 80 stores were forcibly shut down.
For the sellers with the penalty V imposed on, we study how much price they
pay for fake transactions in terms of penalty points. Figure 3.4 depicts the cumula
tive distribution function (CDF) of the deducted points of the 932 Taobao sellers.

It shows th a t about 40% of these sellers had store reputation scores deducted by 1
compared to the day before conducting fake transactions; for about 40% of these
sellers, their store reputation score deduction is between 1 and 2 0 ; and for the rest of
20% of these sellers, their reputation score deduction is more than 20. Taobao’s pub
licly available penalty rules [41] show th at Taobao makes the punishment decisions
based on the total number of fake transactions and the frequency.
For those 89 severely penalized Taobao sellers, we further examined their char
acteristics in terms of their reputation scores at the time of using SRE services,
their store ages when penalized, and the possibly unusual reputation growth before
penalized.
It is interesting to know the reputation scores of these Taobao sellers when their
stores were shut down or reputations were zeroed. Figure 3.5 shows the CDF of
reputation scores of the 89 SRE sellers at the beginning of using SRE services.
About 65% of those sellers had reputation scores of less than 251, i.e., a diamond
grade, when they started fake transaction campaigns on SRE markets, and about
80% with reputation scores of less than 501, i.e., two diamonds grade. The results
imply th at most of those penalized Taobao stores had low reputation scores when
they started to use the SRE services.
We also examined the shop ages of those sellers while being heavily penalized. As
shown in Figure 3.6, about 70% of those sellers ran their Taobao stores for less than
one year, about 50% of them ran Taobao stores for less than half a year, about 30%
ran Taobao stores for only less than three months, and about 7% were penalized
at the same month when they started their Taobao stores. The results indicate
th a t the newly opened Taobao stores tend to use SRE services for escalating their
reputations, which cause them to be closely monitored by Taobo and their conducted
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fake transactions to be more easily detected by Taobao.
In addition, we wonder if those Taobao stores received any light penalties as ad
vance warnings before being heavily penalized or if any unusually dram atic increase
in reputation may trigger an alarm. For the 89 heavily penalized Taobao sellers, we
examined the day-to-day variation in reputation scores. We found th a t 19 (21.3%)
sellers underwent decrement of reputation scores at least once before being heavily
penalized, which indicates th at Taobao had noticed the fake transaction behaviors
of those sellers and already imposed the relatively light penalty V as warning before
further zeroing their reputation scores or shutting down their stores. One Taobao
store was found to have its reputation score decreased for three times within 10 days.
Moreover, 16 (18%) of th e 89 sellers were found to have stunning growth in their
reputation scores within one single day. The unusually rapid growth of reputation
score within a short time period likely caused those stores to have store reputations
zeroed or be shut down afterwards. For instance, one Taobao store had reputation
increased by 2,957 within one day while its daily average reputation increase was
usually close to zero, and then was shut down three days later. Next, we scrutinized
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how quickly the above 35 sellers got severe penalties after receiving warnings or
showing unusual reputation growth. Figure 3.7 shows th at all these 35 sellers were
severely penalized within one month, 70% sellers suffered a heavy penalty within
two weeks, and about 40% within one week.

3.3.3.3

S u m m a ry

Our results dem onstrate th a t 22.7% of the identified sellers received penalty points
for conducting fake transactions and 2 .2 % of these sellers had their store reputations
zeroed or had their stores forcibly shut down. T hat is, according to our observation,
Taobao penalized about 25% of the 4,109 sellers involved in fake transactions with
their Taobao IDs identified. Given th at other punitive measures taken by Taobao
are not observable from outside, our results could underestim ate Taobao’s counter
measures against fake transaction campaigns in SRE markets.

3.3.4

Seller C h aracteristics

Over the two months of measurement, we observed 11,130 Taobao sellers with at
least one task posted on the five SRE markets. By manually undertaking tasks for
one month from February 21, 2014 to March 20, 2014, we identified 4,109 unique
Taobao seller IDs and subsequently crawled their profiles on Taobao. In this section,
we first show what kind of Taobao sellers are more likely to use an SRE service based
on the profiles of the 4,109 identified sellers. Then we feature how active those sellers
are on SRE markets.
S to re S ta r t D a te . The last day we manually undertook tasks was March 20,
2014. We chose this day as a reference date to calculate the age of those sellers’
stores. Figure 3.8 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the store’s
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F igu re 3.8: CDF of shop start date of the identified Taobao sellers.
start date for the 4,109 identified sellers. The plot shows th a t about 70% of those
sellers opened their stores after August 2011, within 2.5 years; 50% of stores have
an age of no more than 1.5 years; 25% of stores were opened for less than half a
year. This indicates th a t SEE markets are more popular among new sellers since
they usually have a stronger desire to improve their stores’ reputation.
M ain B u sin ess. Each Taobao store has one main business. The 4,109 identified
stores fall into nine categories based on their main businesses. Figure 3.9 shows the
top 5 main businesses, which accounts for 69.7% of the 4,109 stores. Specifically,
nearly 40% of stores sell clothing and accessories, which conforms to the fact that
apparel is the most popular buying category on Taobao marketplace. About 10%
of stores sell game and phone cards.
S tore R ep u tation s. We studied the distribution of the store reputations of
the 4,109 identified Taobao sellers when they were observed to use SRE services
at the first time. In Table 3.11, reputation scores are divided into specific ranges
corresponding to various grades specified by the Taobao marketplace. For instance,
a Taobao seller with a reputation score between 251 and 500 has a grade of one
diamond. A reputation score between 501 and 1,000 corresponds to a grade of two
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■ Clothing & Accessories

■ Game & Phone Cards

a Social Services
■ Baby
■ Home Decor

a Other

Figure 3.9: Top 5 main businesses run by the 4,109 Taobao sellers.
diamonds. More details about the Taobao reputation grades are described in Table
3.14 in Section 3.4. Table 3.11 shows th at most of the 4,109 sellers have small
reputation scores. About 50% of those sellers have reputation scores less than 251,
and about 80% have reputation scores less than 1,001. The result is reasonable since
it is pursuing a high reputation score th a t formulates the motivation to use SRE
services for most Taobao sellers.
R ep u tation R an ge
’ P ercentage

0-250
51.1%

251-500
15.5%

501-1,000
12.9%

1,001-2,000
9.0%

2,00111.6% '

Table 3.11: Distribution of the reputation scores of the 4,109 identified Taobao
sellers at the inception of using SRE services.

A ctiv e D u ration .

We crawled the 11,130 sellers’ profiles on SRE markets.

However, only the COOL market provides the consistent and correct information,
while the other SRE markets have shown strange variation in sellers’ profiles over
time. For instance, the total number of tasks posted by a seller on those markets
does not monotonically increase over time but fluctuates irregularly. Thus, we only
consider the profile dataset crawled from the COOL market. A seller is considered
to be active throughout the period from her first posted task to the last one. The
length of this time period is counted as the seller’s active duration on the market.
Figure 3.10 shows the CDF of active durations for the 2,419 sellers on the COOL
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F ig u re 3.10: CDF of active duration of sellers on the COOL market.
market. About 57% of sellers stay active on the COOL market for more than 100
days, 40% for more than 200 days, and about 2% for more than 500 days. Based on
the articles on the COOL market and Whois query results, we conjecture that the
COOL market was founded on August 2012. Our results imply that most sellers on
the COOL market may post tasks for several months or years, and a small portion
have remained active since shortly after the market was formed.
D aily T ask s P o s te d p e r S eller. We also investigate how many tasks a seller
posts daily. Figure 3.11 shows the number of tasks posted daily per active seller
on the five SRE markets during the two months we crawled. It is obvious that the
sellers on the SKY market are most active, with 4.2 tasks posted daily on average
per seller, while the sellers on the NET market are least active, with an average of
2.2 tasks posted daily per seller. The param eter—the number of tasks posted daily
per active seller—shows low variation over time for all markets except that it is
quite low for COOL and NET markets a t the end of February and at the beginning
of March. The reason is th a t the authentication cookies of these two markets expire
so quickly th at we didn’t realize the problem a t first and thus missed many newly
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Figure 3.11: Tasks posted daily per active seller on SRE markets over time. Num
bers in parentheses in the legend denote the mean values of the number of tasks
posted daily per active seller on each SRE market during our crawl interval.
posted tasks.

3.3.5

W orker C haracteristics

The only publicly accessible data about workers on each market is a list of the top
10 workers. In addition, only the COOL market provides consistently reasonable
profile information. For instance, all the SRE markets but COOL set the first time
of sellers to post tasks to be January 1, 2014. Thus, we use the 55 unique workers
appearing in the top 10 worker list on the COOL market for analysis.
We examine their active durations, average tasks undertaken daily, and average
daily earnings. We compute average daily earnings by multiplying average tasks
undertaken daily by 80% of average commission fee per task (because 20 % of com
mission fee is withheld by the market). Figure 3.12(a) plots the CDF of the active
durations for the 55 workers on the COOL market. The active duration of a worker
is the length of the time period during which the worker undertakes tasks. The
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Figure 3.12: (a) CDF of active duration of the top workers on the COOL market.
(b) CDF of average tasks undertaken daily by the top workers on the COOL market.
(c) CDF of average daily earnings of the top workers on the COOL market.
CDF plot shows th a t about 70% of workers have been active for more than 100
days, about 30% of workers for more than 300 days, and about 2% for more than
500 days, which dem onstrates th at the top workers could remain active on the mar
kets for several years. Figure 3.12(b) shows the CDF of average tasks undertaken
daily by the top workers. About 40% of workers undertake more than 5 tasks daily,
about 25% undertake more than 10 tasks daily, and about 10% undertake more
than 20 tasks daily. It takes about 5 minutes to undertake a task as revealed by
the chat contents on SRE markets. Thus, nearly all workers only spend less than 2
hours in taking tasks on SRE markets, which implies th at most workers may take
tasks only in their spare time. We do not have statistics about the demographics
of workers, b ut close monitoring of the IM chat groups on each market reveals that
most workers are college students, housewives, and freelancers. Figure 3.12(c) shows
the CDF of average daily earnings of the 55 workers on the COOL market. More
than one third can earn more than $2 daily, and about 5% earn more than $7 daily.
The daily earnings seems quite low, but it is still attractive considering th at the
completion of a task only costs about 5 minutes, and the per capita daily income
for a Chinese person is about $16 according to the World Bank statistics [39],
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3.3.6

E stim ating R evenue and Fake-Transact ion Volum e

We estimate how much revenue these five SRE markets generated and how large
of a transaction volume they handled during the two-mo nth period we monitored.
The revenue generated by each market consists of the withheld commission fee from
task postings on th at market and the earnings from express tracking label sales.
For each task, SRE markets withhold 20% of the associated commission fee. And
for each physical goods, the corresponding seller needs to purchase from the SRE
market one express tracking label to complete the transaction. Each express tracking
label is charged at a price of $0.4-0.7 depending on the shipment company. SRE
markets cooperate with shipment companies to provide tracking labels for sale. We
do not know how they split the revenue from each sold tracking label and assume
a 50/50 basis. Thus, the revenue generated by a market could be calculated based
on the formula: 20% x C PT x (total task number) + 50% x label price x (total
physical tasks), where C PT denotes the average commission fee per task, ranging
from $0.28 to $0.38 depending on the five markets. In addition, we calculate the
fake-transaction volume handled by an SRE market by adding together the goods’
value in each task we crawled over the course of two months. This metric reflects
the total value of fake transactions conducted through SRE markets during our
observation time period.
Revenue(S)
Trans. Vol.($)
CPT($)
# tasks
# phys. tasks
Label price($)

SKY
11,805
815,130
0.32
63,343
38,753
0.4

W OOD
12,369
1,121,700
0.32
54,824
44,301
0.4

E M PIR E
9,938
674,300
0.28
48,120
36,216
0.4

COOL
9,189
714,730
0.38
39,823
30,811
0.4

N ET
3,137
126,670
0.30
13,055
11,768
0.4

T a b le 3.12: Estimated revenue and transaction volume

Based on the two-month crawled data, Table 3.12 lists our estimation of the
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revenue generated and the fake transaction volume handled by each market during
the two months, along with the param eters involved in the formula for calculating
revenue. We estim ate th a t WOOD generated a revenue of at least $12,369 during the
two months. SKY, EM PIRE, and COOL all generated more than $9,000 revenue.
The revenue generated by NET is slightly more than $3,000. One main reason for
the relatively low revenue of NET is th a t our crawler missed a large portion of task
postings due to the quick cookie expiration. Based on the statistics for the COOL
market, we estim ate th a t its annual revenue will be more than $74,000. Note that
we did not catch all the task postings on SRE markets, and all five SRE markets
simultaneously profit from a variety of other services like selling Taobao accounts
and the TRUSTEE service (we will introduce this in Section 3.4). Therefore, the
estim ated results likely represent only a lower bound of their overall revenues.
We estim ate th at the fake transaction volume handled by each market is enor
mous. For instance, the COOL market handled at least $1,121,700 during the two
months, and it is estim ated to handle the annual transaction volume of more than
$6,700,000. The operators of SRE markets accumulate such a large amount of wealth
in a short time, and they may make off with money that sellers and workers deposit
into the markets. Actually, at least two SRE markets have been reported to make off
with millions of dollars, and the involved sellers and workers suffer heavy financial
losses [43, 44],

3.4

E ffectiv en ess o f S R E serv ices

In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness of a typical SRE service requiring
sellers to post tasks on SRE markets. Then, we present a more worrisome service
newly launched by one SRE market and evaluate its effectiveness.
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3.4.1

Effect o f P osting Tasks on SR E M arket

By manually undertaking tasks for one month, we identified 4,109 unique Taobao
sellers, denoted as “EVIL” sellers.

One interesting question is whether posting

tasks on SRE markets could indeed improve sellers’ reputations on Taobao. Or, can
a seller using SRE services increase her store reputation remarkably faster than a
fellow Taobao seller who has the same store age, sells the same categories of goods,
but does not use SRE services? To address this question, we randomly selected
4,000 legitimate Taobao sellers who follow the same distribution of store ages and
main businesses as those 4,109 SRE sellers. We denote these random sellers as
“BENI” , standing for benign sellers, which is arguably a fine assumption since the
possibility th at a randomly selected Taobao seller performs fake transactions on the
SRE markets is extremely small considering the order of magnitude of active sellers
on Taobao. We compare the two groups’ growth curves in their store reputations
to evaluate the effectiveness of SRE services.
S et
Store age

1
2
< lm <2m

3
<3m

4
<6m

5
< ly

6
<2y

T a b le 3.13: The store ages based on which we partition EVIL and BENI sellers.
“< lm ” denotes a store age of less than 1 month while “< ly ” denotes less than 1
year.

We argue th at only the comparison in reputation growth between the two stores
with similar ages and selling the same category of goods makes sense. Thus, for
the two groups of sellers, EVIL and BENI, we only consider those selling clothing
and accessories (the most popular business run by the Taobao sellers identified to
be using SRE services, see Figure 3.9). We further partition each group into six sets
based on store age. Table 3.13 enumerates the store ages used for partition. We
focus on the sellers with store ages not exceeding 2 years because they represent a
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F ig u re 3.13: Comparison of the reputation growth distribution between BENI and
EVIL stores with varying store ages over the course of one month.
majority of Taobao sellers on SRE markets (see Figure 3.8).
In Figure 3.13, we use boxplots to compare the distribution of reputation growth
across one m onth between EVIL stores and BENI stores with varying store ages.
Note th at for each box, its bottom corresponds to the reputation increase of the
Taobao seller on the 25th percentile, its top corresponds to th at of the seller on the
75th percentile, and the line across the box corresponds to th at of the seller in the
median.
These boxplots clearly show th at the reputations of EVIL stores increase much
faster than those of BENI stores, regardless of the store age and time interval.
W ithin one week, EVIL stores increase their reputation scores by a median value
(represented by the median line of each magenta box) of 6 to 8 , and by a median
value of 22 to 30 within four weeks. The top 25% of EVIL stores (represented by the
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whiskers on top of m agenta boxes) increase their reputation scores by 14 to 18 at
least (depending on store ages) within one week, and by 50 to 82 at least within one
month. In contrast, the reputation scores of BENI stores with different store ages
increase at a much slower rate. The median line of each blue box representing BENI
stores overlaps with the x axis, implying th at the median increase in reputation
scores of BENI stores with different store ages is zero. It indicates th at about 50%
of BENI stores have not completed any transactions during the entire month. In
addition, the top 25% of BENI stores (represented by the whiskers on top of the
blue boxes) increase their reputation scores by 1 at least within one week and by 5
to 8 at least within one month, which is merely one-tenth of the reputation increase
of the top 25% EVIL stores within one month.

For all six kinds of store ages,

the reputation increase of EVIL stores within one week (represented by the first
magenta box in each subplot) is much larger than that of BENI stores within one
month (represented by the last blue box in each subplot).
In summary, Taobao stores can remarkably increase their reputation scores by
posting tasks on SRE markets, achieving higher ratings up to 10 times faster than
legitimate stores. Actually, the effectiveness of SRE services is directly related to the
Taobao’s reputation com putation method, which could be boiled down to one sen
tence th a t a Taobao seller earns one reputation score for each completed transaction
with good ratings. And the three main inputs to the Taobao’s reputation compu
tation m ethod—transaction volumes, product ratings, and customer reviews—are
exactly what an unscrupulous seller gains from fake-purchase activities conducted
through SRE markets.
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3.4.2

A n E m erging Service and Its E ffectiveness

A new service was launched by the EM PIRE market on March 7, 2014. Different
from the typical SRE service discussed above, this service does not require sellers
to post tasks but demands full control of sellers’ Taobao stores during the service
time. The market operator does not disclose how this service is implemented but
guarantees to increase sellers’ reputation scores by up to 10,000 within several days.
This service is quite attractive, since a legitimate seller may need several years to
achieve the same reputation level, and even an insincere seller m ust tediously post
about 10,000 tasks on SRE markets. We refer to this service as the TRUSTEE
service.
D e sir e d G rad e
1 diamond
2 diamonds
3 diamonds
4 diamonds
5 diamonds
1 crown

R e p u ta tio n A
251
501
1,001
2,001
5,001
10,001

F ee (U S D )
96
192
384
720
1,200
2,080

D ays
3
5
7
9
11
13

T a b le 3.14: TRUSTEE service expense standard: list of desired Taobao grade,
corresponding reputation score increase, charged fees, and days needed to complete.

Table 3.14 presents the expense standard of the TRUSTEE service. The charged
fees vary with desired Taobao grades3. According to the expense standard, a seller
can obtain a diamond grade (i.e., increasing reputation by 251) within 3 days at
the cost of $96 while gaining a crown grade (i.e., increasing reputation by 10,001)
requires $2,080 and 13 days.
We crawled the EM PIRE market once daily for the list of customers who pur
chased this service from March 9, 2014 to April 21, 2014 and collected 108 Taobao
sellers using this service. However, their Taobao IDs are not included in the crawled
3Taobao sellers have twenty grades going from one to five hearts, then one to five diamonds,
then one to five crowns, and lastly one to five golden crowns. Taobao sellers need a specific number
of transactions completed with positive reviews to progress to higher grades.
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F ig u re 3.14: Reputation changes over time for the 12 Taobao sellers identified to
use TRUSTEE service.
d ata and cannot be recognized by manually undertaking tasks, due to no task post
ings from those sellers. To reveal their Taobao IDs, we leverage one observation
th a t some Taobao sellers use their Taobao IDs as their SRE account names. Thus,
we crawled the Taobao marketplace and examined whether a Taobao store whose
ID matches an existing SRE account. In this way, we successfully identified the
Taobao IDs for 12 sellers. Subsequently, we performed daily crawling of these stores
on Taobao to monitor their reputation changes.
Figure 3.14 shows the dynamics of the reputation scores of these 12 sellers,
denoted as S1-S12, during and after their use of the TRUSTEE service.

Each

subplot depicts one seller’s reputation change. In each subplot, a steep increase
corresponds to one use of the TRUSTEE service. We make several observations
from this figure. First, the use of the TRUSTEE service can significantly increase
sellers’ store reputation by a desired amount. We observed th a t each of these 12
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sellers increased their reputation scores after receiving the TRUSTEE service by
251 or 1,001, corresponding to one diamond and three diamonds in Table 3.14,
respectively. Second, some sellers may use the TRUSTEE service more than once.
For instance, seller Si used the TRUSTEE service twice within two weeks and
requested an increase of 251 each time. Third, each request for the TRUSTEE
service can be fulfilled within one day. Note th a t seller S3 requested an increase
of 1,001 in reputation and was also satisfied within one day. Forth, it seems th at
the TRUSTEE service cannot guarantee a continuous increase in reputation nor an
instant increase in sales. For each seller, the curve remains flat in the following 10 to
15 days after using the service. Fifth, only two sellers were observed to be penalized
by Taobao. The reputation scores of two sellers S9 and S12 were reduced to zero
in 7 to 10 days after their use of the TRUSTEE service. We conjecture th at the
two sellers were penalized by Taobao for their reputation manipulation. Lastly, four
of those 12 Taobao stores using the service were newly opened within the past six
months. Especially, two stores began using the service just a few days after their
opening. It seems th at this service is quite popular among new Taobao stores.

3.5

P o te n tia l M itig a tio n S tr a te g ie s an d L im ita
tio n

Although reputation manipulation is known for a long time in e-commerce, there is
no open literature studying this specific SRE problem and we are the first to term
the SRE markets and investigate them. Existing attacks against reputation systems
include self-promoting, whitewashing, slandering, orchestrated attack, and DoS at
tack [45]. Compared to those known attacks, the newly emerging SRE problem is
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much more sophisticated in three aspects: ( 1) much more organized (in the form
of crowdsourcing), (2 ) much more severe (about tens of thousands of sellers and
workers are involved during a short window of two months), and (3) much harder to
detect (SRE market operators have formulated elaborate strategies for each step in
volved in a purchase transaction). In addition, our study shows th a t only 2.2% of the
fraudulent sellers were detected, indicating th at the Taobao’s existing proprietary
fake-transaction detection mechanisms fail in the face of the SRE problem.
Moreover, we believe th at most existing detection mechanisms are vulnerable
to SRE reputation escalation because the existing detection mechanisms do not
consider the factor of shipping. In fact, whether the ordered products are delivered
or not is the only difference between fake purchases conducted through SRE markets
and real purchases.
We realize th a t the booming SRE business depends on four components: a highly
available website to connect Taobao sellers and workers; express mail tracking labels
sold to sellers; Taobao buyer accounts sold to task workers; and an escrow mecha
nism to resolve disputes between sellers and workers. Accordingly, defenders could
develop a set of intervention approaches.
D o m ain R egistrar and W eb H osting. If registrars were to suspend SRE
m arkets’ domains and web hosting service providers were to take down SRE market
sites, the business of SRE markets would be interrupted immediately. We note that
even tem porary unavailability of SRE sites causes panic among involved sellers and
workers greatly since they worry about their deposits on the SRE markets.
Shipping. Taobao could identify the shipment companies colluding with SRE
markets and pressure them to terminate the cooperation. In addition, Taobao could
collaborate with shipment companies to identify fake tracking numbers.
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Taobao A ccou n ts. To undertake tasks, a professional worker may need tens
of Taobao accounts. Taobao accounts on SRE markets serve as the essential tools
to conduct fake transactions, which highlights the need for Taobao account abuse
detection at registration time.
E scrow Service P rovid ed by S R E M arkets. Escrow services used by SRE
markets are all based on Alipay, the escrow system provided by Taobao. Actually,
each SRE market operator has a publicly visible Alipay account to accept the money
from a seller before posting tasks and to release money to task workers after the
completion of tasks. Thus, suspending Alipay accounts used by SRE markets would
dramatically demonetize the underlying enterprise.
In addition, by targeting SRE m arkets’ evasion strategies revealed in this work,
Taobao can further improve its current detection mechanism. A high risk of being
penalized for fake transactions would cause Taobao sellers to abandon SRE services.
In addition, the especially high popularity of SRE markets with new Taobao stores
indicates th at some measures should be taken by online marketplaces to help new
stores to promote without hurting the fairness to established stores.
L im itation s. Here we clarify the limitations of our study. First, we only inves
tigated the SRE markets catering to online sellers from the Taobao marketplace in
our study, although there indeed exist several other SRE markets targeting other
Chinese marketplaces such as JD.com [40]. Taobao is much larger than the rest
of the online marketplaces in China and even larger than Amazon and eBay. We
believe th at the SRE markets we studied are representative of the current SRE in
dustry. In addition, our study sounds an alarm for other major online marketplaces,
indicating th a t they may also suffer the same problem of fake transactions.
Second, there exist limitations in our dataset. Our crawler failed to catch all
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task postings during the two months we monitored, due to unexpected network
connection failures or expired authentication cookies. Thus, our evaluation results
only represent a lower bound. Moreover, we cannot collect much more information
about workers due to a limited amount of data available. Specifically, a list of the
top 10 workers periodically updated is all the data related to workers and publicly
available on an SRE market. Furthermore, some crawled d ata turned out to be
unreasonable and was discarded. For instance, all the SRE markets but COOL set
the first time of sellers to post tasks to be January 1 , 2014. Only the COOL market
provides consistently reasonable seller profile information. Thus, we only use the
profile dataset crawled on the COOL market for analysis.
Finally, we did not implement a robust fake-purchase detection mechanism for
evaluating our proposed intervention approaches, which requires the deployment
cooperation from Taobao. We leave the defense evaluation for our future work.

3.6

R e v isit th e S R E E c o sy ste m O n e Y ear L ater

Since the spring 2014, the problem of fake transactions in the e-commerce ecosystem
has attracted wide attention from the public, industry, and research communities.
Thus, we revisit the SRE markets infiltrated one year ago, including the involved
Taobao sellers, to examine the possible changes in the SRE ecosystem.
Among the five SRE markets we infiltrated, EM PIRE is found to have been shut
down by some law enforcement agencies. Another SRE market, NET, cannot be
accessed by us due to the account/password loss. Thus, during a time period of
40 days from April 16, 2015 to May 26, 2015, we performed continuous crawling
of the remaining three SRE markets — SKY, WOOD, and COOL — for newly
posted tasks, and crawled the Taobao marketplace once daily for the reputation
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scores of the 3,221 SRE sellers who posted tasks on the three SRE markets and had
their Taobao IDs identified by us in 2014. For the convenience of illustration, we
continue to use EVIL to denote those 3,221 SRE stores as we did for the 4,109 ones
in Section 3.4. For the B E N I stores mentioned in Section 3.4, we examined their
current statuses (e.g., shut down or still open) and compared the reputation growth
across one year between the BE N I stores and the EVIL ones.
W ith the collected d ata set, we attem pt to answer the following questions: (1)
are the SRE markets still so dynamic as they were a year ago? (2) are the 11,130
SRE sellers observed to post tasks last year still posting tasks on the SRE markets?
(3) how do the reputation scores of the 3,221 SRE stores grow in the past one year?
and (4) is the reputation growth curve of the EVIL stores different from th at of the
B E N I ones, and how?

3.6.1

C urrent S tatu ses o f SRE M arkets

By continuously crawling the three SRE markets for a time period of 40 days from
April 16, 2015 to May 26, 2015, we evaluate the current dynamism of the SRE
markets and attem p t to spot any changes in their popularity across one year.
Table 3.15 summarizes the dataset we crawled on the three SRE markets. Specifi
cally, we collected 31,997 fake-transaction tasks in total, contributed by 2,687 unique
Taobao sellers. Each day, up to 794 new tasks were posted on an SRE market, and
up to 297 sellers were observed to post tasks on a market.
We made a comparison between the dynamism of the three SRE markets in
2015 and th a t of the same SRE markets about a year ago. Table 3.16 details the
comparison results, showing th at the three SRE markets are not as active as they
were a year ago. Specifically, compared to the results in 2014, we observed evident
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M arket
SKY
WOOD
COOL
Total

Total tasks
9,035
11,449
11,513
31,997

Total sellers
683
904
1,100
2,687

D aily new tasks (m ax)
457
669
794
-

D aily active sellers (m ax)
162 '
262
297
-

T a b le 3.15: Statistics of total task postings, total active sellers, maximum daily
new tasks, and maximum daily active sellers on the three SRE markets during 40
days.
decrements in the three metrics — daily new tasks, daily active sellers, and daily
tasks posted per seller. On the three SRE markets, the average number of daily new
tasks falls by 42.1% to 68.3%; the average population of daily active sellers falls by
36.1% to 54.9%; and the average number of daily tasks per seller falls by 12.5% to
40.5%. We speculate th a t the widespread concern over the e-commerce reputation
manipulation problem and much more effective countermeasures taken by Taobao
since last year have contributed to the dram atic decline in activities on the SRE
markets.
i
j
M arket
SKY
. WOOD:
COOL
j

D aily new tasks
(avg.)
2015
2014
rate
301
951
4-68.3%'
382
816
453.2%
384
663
442.1%

D aily active sellD aily tasks per
ers (avg.)
; seller (avg.)
2015
2014
rate
2015
2014
rate
101
224
454.9%' 2.5
4.2
440.5%
138
297
453.5% 2.3
2.7
414.8%
149
233
436.1% 2.1
2.4
412.5%

T a b le 3.16: Variation of the dynamism of the three SRE markets in the past one
year.

3.6.2

Current A ctiv ities o f SR E Sellers on SRE M arkets

During the two months from February 2014 to April 2014, we observed 8,473 SRE
sellers ever posting tasks on the SKY, WOOD, and COOL markets. Note th at there
are 3,221 out of the 8,473 sellers, for which we were able to identify their Taobao
IDs by manually undertaking tasks.
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We revisited the three SRE markets to examine how many of the 8,473 sellers
previously captured are still active on the SRE markets and then monitor their
task posting activities. Table 3.17 lists the number of sellers still active on each
SRE market, the percentage of them in the 8,473 sellers, and the percentage they
represent in these sellers currently active in 2015. It shows th at in total 559 SRE
sellers observed last year were still posting tasks on the SRE markets during the 40
days we monitored this year. They represent 6.6% of the 8,473 sellers and 20.8% of
the 2,687 SRE sellers currently active on the three SRE markets.
M arket # o f 8,473 sellers
still active
SKY
89
"
WOOD !221
, COOL
:249
Total
559

% o f 8,473 sellers
still active
' 3.2% (89/2,789)
7.4% (221/2,968)
9.2% (249/2,716)
6.6% (559/8,473)

occupy % in currently active sellers
' 13.0% (89/683)
24.4% (221/904)
22.6% (249/1,100)
; 20.8% (559/2,687)

T a b le 3.17: Current status of the 8,473 sellers on the SRE markets.
We then analyzed how active these 559 sellers were on the SRE markets in 2015 in
terms of the number of task postings per active seller per day. Each seller was found
to post 2.2 tasks each day on average and the median was 1.75. Then we compared
these results in 2015 to those in 2014 for the same set of 559 active sellers. Figure
3.15 shows the comparison, indicating th a t the number of task postings per active
seller per day in 2015 is similar to th at in 2014, with just a slight decrease.

3.6.3

C urrent S tatu ses of th e EVIL Taobao Stores on th e
Taobao M arketplace

Based on the information returned by Taobao upon our crawling for the profiles of
the 3,221 EVIL stores, we disclosed those stores’ current statuses. Specifically, a
Taobao store is regarded to be inaccessible when Taobao continuously returns in81
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F ig u re 3.15: CDF of task postings per active seller per day in 2015 v.s. th a t in
2014
formation showing th at the store does not exist during the 40 days we monitored;
otherwise, a store is considered active on the Taobao marketplace if its profile infor
mation could be normally retrieved. In addition, for the purpose of comparison, we
performed the same operations for the 4,000 B E N I stores and unveiled their current
statuses.
Table 3.18 lists the statistics about the current statuses of both EVIL and BENI
Taobao stores. It shows th at currently 83.3% of the EVIL stores are active while
16.7% are inaccessible, and for the B ENI stores, 87.8% are active and 12.2% axe
inaccessible. The inaccessible ratio of the EVIL stores is slightly higher than th a t of
the BENI ones. We also paid special attention to the 89 Taobao stores th at suffered
from heavy penalties (reputation zeroed or forcibly shut down) in 2014, and found
th a t 47 of them are still inaccessible, which may indicate th a t more than a half of
Taobao stores will not be reopened once reputation-zeroed or shut down.
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3.6.3.1

R ep u ta tio n G row th o f th e A ctive EVIL Stores A cross O ne Year

Since we stopped crawling the SRE markets during the time period from April 22,
2014 to April 15, 2015, we cannot know whether the EVIL sellers continued posting
tasks on the SRE markets during th at period of time. However, it is still interesting
to examine the difference between the 2,682 active EVIL stores and 3,512 active
B ENI stores in their reputation growth in the past one year.
Similar to w hat we did in Section 3.4, we only considered those selling clothing
and accessories in the two groups of EVIL and B E N I stores.

A store’s current

reputation score does affect its future reputation growth over a long time period,
like one year.

Thus, based on a store’s reputation score on April 21, 2014 and

the reputation grades defined by Taobao in Table 3.14, we partitioned each group
of stores into four sets — “x<501,” “501< =x< l,001,” “l,001<=x<2,001,” and
“x>=2,001.”

We then compared the reputation growth curve between the two

group of stores with similar reputation scores in 2014 and selling the same category
of goods. Specifically, we compute the reputation increase as the difference between
the reputation scores of 2015 and 2014, and then divide the reputation increase by
the reputation score of 2014 to derive the reputation growth rate for each seller.
In Figures 3.16 and 3.17, we use boxplots to compare the distribution of reputa
tion growth across one year, in terms of the reputation increase and the reputation
growth rate, between EVIL stores and B E N I stores with varying reputation grades.
M arket
' SKY
; WOOD
: cool
! Total
BENI

% active
83.3% (1,109/1,332)
83.4% (1,027/1,232)
83.1% (546/657)
83.3% (2,682/3,221)
87.8% (3,512/4,000)

% inaccessible
16.7%
16.6%
16.9%
16.7%
12.2%

(223/1,332)
(205/1,232)
(111/657)
(539/3,221)
(488/4,000)

Table 3.18: Current statuses of EVIL and BE NI stores.
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F igure 3.16: Comparison between currently active EVIL and B E N I sellers in
terms of reputation increase across one
year.
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F igure 3.17: Comparison between cur
rently active EVIL and BENI sellers in
terms of reputation growth rate across
one year.

The two figures clearly show th at the reputations of EVIL stores increase faster
than those of BE N I stores in both metrics — reputation increase and reputation
growth rate — for the stores with all varying reputation grades except the grade
set of “l,001< = x< 2,001.” Take the stores with the reputation grade set of “<501”
an an example, within one year, EVIL stores increase their reputation scores by a
median value of 129 and at a median rate of 100%, while BENI stores only increase
store reputations by a median value of 31 and at a median rate of 61%.

3.6 .3 .2

R eason in g W h y EV IL S tores B ecom e Inaccessible N ow

For the 539 currently inaccessible EVIL stores th at were active at the end of our
monitoring in April 2014, it is hard to tell whether each store was forcibly shut
down by Taobao for conducting fake transactions or it just died a “natural death.
This is because we have not continuously monitored their reputation changes in
the past one year. However, we attem pt to uncover the hidden reasons why those
stores become inaccessible by checking their profile information on Taobao across
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F ig u re 3.18: CDF of monthly reputation increase of the currently inaccessible BENI stores between 3/21/2014 and
4/21/2014.

F ig u re 3.19: CDF of monthly reputa
tion increase of the currently inaccessi
ble EVIL stores between 2/21/2014 and
4/21/2014.

the two months we monitored last year from February 2014 to April 2014. To make
insightful findings, we took the 488 currently inaccessible BE NI stores as a control
group with the assumption th at each BENI store underwent a “natural death.” The
assumption is reasonable since there are millions of stores on Taobao and it is quite
normal for a small proportion of stores to die naturally each year.
Specifically, for each of the 539 inaccessible EVIL stores, we examined its monthly
reputation increase, monthly reputation growth rate, and monthly completed trans
action volumes from February 2014 to April 2014. We also did the same examination
on the 488 currently inaccessible BE NI stores. We then compared the distributions
of those three metrics between EVIL stores and BENI stores to spot the possible
reasons for those EVIL stores to become inaccessible now.
Figure 3.18 depicts the monthly reputation increase of the currently inaccessible
BE N I stores during one month we monitored in 2014. It shows th a t more than
60% B E N I stores did not increase their reputations at all within a whole month;
and only 20% stores increased their reputations by at least 15. According to our
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and 4/21/2014.
assumption, the distribution depicted in Figure 3.18 could be regarded to represent
the distribution of monthly reputation increase for typical Taobao stores which are
to be “dying naturally.”

More specifically, the figure indicates th a t most dying

Taobao stores have nearly stopped or at least have difficulty in gaining business
before a “natural death.” Figure 3.19 depicts the monthly reputation increase of
the currently inaccessible EVIL stores during the two months last year. It shows that
about 95% of EV IL stores achieved increase in their reputations within a month;
60% increased their reputations by at least 15; and 30% by at least 45. These
results dem onstrate th a t those EVIL stores showed great ability in gaining business
in 2014, quite different from the performance th a t those B E N I stores presented.
This observation indicates th a t the currently inaccessible EVIL stores were probably
forcibly shut down by Taobao for fake transactions.
We also examined the monthly growth rate of reputation score in 2014 for both
th e currently inaccessible EV IL stores and BE N I stores. In Figure 3.20, it shows that
over 70% B E N I stores had a monthly reputation growth rate of zero. In contrast,
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Figure 3.21 shows th at only less than 20% of the currently inaccessible EVIL stores
increased their reputations at a rate of zero, and more than 30% of those EVIL
stores at least doubled their reputations within a month (i.e., at a growth rate of
1). Thus, it is unlikely th a t those EVIL stores died naturally when they were able
to increase their reputations at such a large rate.
Lastly, we examined the monthly transaction volumes completed by both the
currently inaccessible EVIL stores and B E N I stores in 2014. In Figure 3.22, it shows
th a t more than 60% of the currently inaccessible B E N I stores did not complete
any transaction volume within a month and about 20% completed the transaction
volumes of between 1 and 9. On the contrary, Figure 3.23 shows th at only about 15%
of the currently inaccessible EV IL stores did not complete any transaction volume,
and about 55% completed transaction volumes of more than 10. Again, those EVIL
sellers seemed quite active in doing business on Taobao and unlikely closed their
stores voluntarily in the following one year.
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3.6 .3 .3

S u m m a ry

The above analysis of the currently inaccessible EVIL stores, in terms of their rep
utation changes and the completed transaction volumes during the two months we
monitored last year, implies th a t it is probably the heavy penalties imposed by
Taobao for fake transactions th a t causes those EVIL stores to become inaccessible
currently, rather than th a t they shut down the stores at their own choices.

3.6.4

Sum m ary

By revisiting the SRE markets and the involved sellers one year later since our
previous study, we first evaluated the current dynamism of the SRE markets and
found th at the SRE markets are not so active as they were one year ago. Then
we examined the current activities of the involved sellers on the SRE markets and
observed th at only 6.6% of those sellers are still posting fake-transaction tasks.
Finally, we scrutinized the current statuses of these ID-identified SRE stores on
the Taobao marketplace and found th at about 83% are active and 17% become
inaccessible. W ith the randomly selected Taobao stores as a control group, we found
th a t those active SRE stores increased their reputations faster than the random
Taobao stores in the past one year. For the currently inaccessible SRE stores, we
speculate th a t they probably suffered heavy penalties imposed by Taobao for their
fake transactions during the past one year, which caused those stores to close down.

3 .7

R e la te d W ork

Over the past few years, many researchers have focused their studies on underground
markets. Several works studied the underground economy related to Tw itter, in

eluding markets for selling fraudulent accounts [70, 71] and Tw itter followers [65].
McCoy et al. examined the role of payment processing in the underground economy
[57]. Motoyama et al. studied the social dynamics of underground forums [60] and
investigated the market for CAPTCHA-solving services [59]. Franklin et al. [48]
measured the commoditization of fraudulent activities on an underground market.
Christin performed a similar measurement on Silk Road, an anonymous online mar
ketplace [47]. Caballero et al. [46] and Grier et al. [49] studied the pay-per-install
market and exploit-as-a-service model for malware distribution. In [52, 58], the au
thors studied the markets for online pharmaceutical sales. Park et al. [64] leveraged
magnetic honeypot ads to study Nigerian scams on Craigslist.
Our work is also related to previous studies on crowdsourcing marketplaces,
which enable people (known as requesters) to coordinate the use of human intelli
gence to perform tasks th a t computers are currently unable to do [42]. Since workers
on crowdsourcing marketplaces can intentionally deliver low-quality work, Ipeirotis
et al. presented an algorithm to estimate the quality of workers [51]. In addition,
requesters may maliciously deny payment to workers. To address this problem, Ho
et al. proposed the social-norms-based incentive mechanisms to augment crowd
sourcing systems [50]. Crowdsourcing markets can also be employed for web service
abuse. Miscreants could easily recruit a large group of workers to solve CAPTCHAs
[59], register a multitude of fraudulent OSN accounts, and send email spam [61],
etc. Similarly, SRE markets also operate in the crowdsourcing model. However,
SRE markets target special requesters, i.e., online sellers, and provide special ser
vices, i.e., fake purchases on online shopping marketplaces.
R eputation systems are quite im portant to the e-commerce ecosystem. Several
work [63, 54, 55, 56] investigated the online review manipulation and some others
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[62, 53, 66] proposed methods to detect deceptive opinion spam, i.e. fake reviews
w ritten to deliberately mislead readers. O tt et al. explored the prevalence of de
ception in several popular online review communities [63]. Mayzlin et al. provided
an empirical investigation of online review manipulation on two travel websites [54].
Chen et al. [69] conducted a real case study of opinion spams in a web forum. Nosko
et al. discussed the limits of reputation mechanisms used in e-commerce markets
[55]. Mukherjee et al. aimed to spot fake reviewers using behavior footprints [62].
Li et al. proposed a three-layer graph model to identify m anipulated offerings on
review portals [53]. Swamynathan et al. [66] proposed a reliable reputation system
to address the attacks targeting reputation systems. Akoglu et al. proposed ap
proaches th a t utilize network effect [67] or consider both the m etadata and network
factors [68] for spotting fraudsters and fake reviews. In this study, we examined
a newly emerging underground industry in which a potentially unbounded number
of inexpensive human laborers are hired to conduct fake purchases for reputation
inflation. This way of tainting the reputation system is more advanced and beyond
the attacks known previously.

3.8

C o n clu sio n

We have conducted the first systematic study of a seller-reputation-escalation (SRE)
ecosystem by infiltrating five SRE markets. These markets specialize in accommo
dating online marketplace sellers to post fake-purchase tasks for escalating their
business reputations. We performed daily crawls for two months and observed that
more than 11,000 online sellers posted nearly 220,000 tasks on the five SRE mar
kets. Each new task could be undertaken within seconds. SRE markets turn out
to be quite popular with online sellers. In addition, we examined the tactics for
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mulated by SRE markets for evading the online marketplace defenders’ detection
mechanism of fake transactions. Those tactics are so sophisticated that only about
25% of illegitimate online sellers were visibly penalized for fake transaction. More
over, we characterized the online sellers involved in fake transactions and discovered
th at most of them run new stores and mainly sell clothing or game cards on the
online marketplace. Furthermore, we evaluated the effectiveness of SRE services
and revealed th a t the illegitimate sellers using SRE services can increase their rep
utations 10 times faster than legitimate ones. In addition, we investigated a newly
launched SRE service and found th at the service can increase sellers’ reputations by
up to thousands within one day. We estimated th at an SRE market can generate
annual revenue of over $70,000 and handle annual fake-transaction volume of over
$6,700,000. We also discussed possible intervention approaches and proposed that
the joint interventions at the domain, web hosting, shipping, account registration,
and payment tiers are probably the most viable defense strategy. Finally, we pre
sented the findings from our revisiting of the SRE ecosystem one year later. We
found th a t the SRE markets are not so active as they were and that about 17%
of the 4,109 identified Taobao stores are inaccessible probably due to the heavy
penalties imposed by Taobao for fake transactions.
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C hapter 4
A ssessin g P rivacy R isks on O nline
P h o to s
Online photo privacy, which we are trying to address, has become a great concern
nowadays. In this work, we first conduct a large amount of measurement to exam
ine the prevalence of m etadata and study the photo handling policies adopted by
hundreds of top media sites. Then we dem onstrate an im portant attack vector not
exploited before and further propose an efficient re-identification attack.
To obtain a representative dataset for our study, we collected nearly 200,000 pho
tos in total in various ways including soliciting freshly taken photos through crowd
sourcing, downloading original sized, intact photos from a m ajor photo sharing site,
and crawling “wild” photos from Google Images and over 600 top ranked websites.
We examined the m etadata information embedded in these photos and found th at
m etadata was prevalent among photos at each of the. three stages. We paid special
attention to the m etadata fields th at may give rise to great privacy concerns. We
found th a t about 10% of “fresh” photos were tagged with GPS coordinates while
27%-37% of “intact” photos and only about 1% of “wild” photos contained GPS
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information. We also measured the percentages of photos containing other sensitive
m etadata information including a photographer’s name and modification history.
To understand how a photo is processed after being shared online, we also in
vestigated online sites’ policies on handling photos based on 97,664 photos crawled
from 679 unique top sites in seven categories— “social networking,” “news,” “we
blog,” “college,” “government,” “shopping,” and “classified” 1 sites. We found th at
photo handling policies adopted by online sites vary with different categories. The
“college” and “government” sites hardly resize the photos they host or remove the
embedded m etadata information. However, the sites in the other categories are
more likely to resize the photos and remove the m etadata information. Finally,
we proposed th a t the m etadata field camera serial number could be used as an
attack vector. For 62.6% of unique photographers, we were able to uncover their
both online and real-world identities with just one photo they ever took and posted
online.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We provide background
knowledge in Section 4.1. We describe data collection methods for “fresh” photos
and characterize them in Section 4.2. We examine “intact” photos in Section 4.3.
We characterize “wild” photos and investigate online sites’ photo handling policies in
Section 4.4. We dem onstrate the re-identification attack in Section 4.5. We discuss
the lim itation of this work and propose our future work in Section 4.6. We survey
the related work in Section 4.7 and conclude the chapter in Section 4.8.
' “Classified” refers to the classified advertisements sites such as Craigslist.
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4.1

B ack grou n d

In this section, we first give an overview of the m etadata information typically
contained in a digital photo, then discuss the potential privacy concerns, and finally
illustrate the three stages we define for digital photos.

4.1.1

M etad ata Inform ation in a P h o to

There are three most commonly used m etadata standards for photos: EXIF, XMP,
and IPTC. They often coexist in a photo and constitute the main part of the photo
m etadata. Table 4.1 lists the m etadata fields typically included in a photo grouped
by category.
[ C a te g o ry
; W hen
|" W here
I How

! I n f o r m a tio n
D ate Tim e
j Location
| Device Info.
i

Who
W hat

People
Description

Modification

M odification History

I
'
:
j
i

F ie ld s
create tim e, modify tim e
G PS coordinates, city /sta te /c o u n try
cam era make, model, serial num ber, light source, exposure mode, flash, ap ertu re settings, ISO setting, shutter
speed, focal length, color information
a rtis t’s name
title, headline, caption, by-line, keywords, copyright,
special instructions
create tool, xm p toolkit, history action, history when,
history software agent, history param eters

T a b le 4.1: List of m etadata information typically included in a digital photo.
A digital photo typically contains ample m etadata information. When a shot is
taken, the camera automatically embeds into the photo all the information it knows
about the camera itself and the photo. In addition, users can add their own de
scriptive information with image processing software. Specifically, typical m etadata
information can be summarized as follows: (1) when - when the photo is created
and modified if applicable, (2) where - the exact location (GPS coordinates and
altitude) at which the photo is captured if a GPS receiver is equipped and enabled,
or coarse-grained location information such as city/state/country, (3) how - the
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camera device used, its make, model, serial number, light circumstances (sunny
or cloudy, flash on or off), exposure (auto or manual), and all other parameters
used, (4) who - the photographer and the people depicted in the photo if manually
added during post processing, (5) what - title, headline, caption, keywords, copy
right restriction, and other detailed descriptions added for logging, organization or
copyright protection, and (6) modification - if the photo is modified, on what date
and time, by what software on what computer, and the specific actions done to the
photo.

4.1.2

P o ten tial Privacy Concerns A rising from P h o to M eta
d ata

Most m etadata fields may look innocent and trivial. However, some could raise
serious privacy concerns. We highlight several sensitive m etadata fields below.
G eolocation . Contemporary cameras and smartphones are typically equipped
w ith GPS functions. When taking photos with these GPS-enabled devices, geolo
cation information is automatically saved into the m etadata. For a photo posted
online, anybody able to access it could check the m etadata information and may
get the geolocation where the photo was taken. This definitely violates the privacy
of the photographer and the people depicted. For instance, the time and location
embedded in an online photo indicated th at a public figure had been at an embar
rassing location and not where he claimed to have been [76]. Moreover, a geo-located
photo obviously taken at home and depicting high-value goods may give burglars
incentives. In addition, young parents usually like to post many photos of their
kids online, which may raise great concerns because the photos tagged with GPS
coordinates could disclose the exact locations of where their kids live, play, or study.
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P h o to g ra p h er’s /O w n e r ’s inform ation. Some photos explicitly contain in
the m etadata the photographers’ information, among which the name information
is most commonly seen. No m atter whether such information is embedded with
or without the photographers’ awareness, disclosing such information may cause
identity leakage, especially given the availability of geolocation information in the
m etadata.
M od ification H istory. When post processing a digital photo, an image pro
cessing software like Adobe Photoshop and Apple iPhoto often automatically embeds
into the photo the detailed modification information, represented by three m etadata
fields: History When, History Software, and History Parameters. Table 4.2 presents
an example of the embedded modification information in a photo. For the conve
nience of illustration, we add the photo’s shot time in the table. It clearly shows
th a t the photo has been processed twice in less than one month since it was taken
on July 16, 2014. And two versions of Adobe Photoshop on one or two Macintosh
computers were ever used for format conversion and save actions.
C r e a te D a t e
■ H isto r y W h e n
2014:07:16 15:13:56 T 2014:07:19
i 01:30:03,
2014:08:08 21:17:25

H isto r y S o ftw a re
Adobe
Photoshop
Lightroom 5.4 (M ac
intosh), A dobe Pho
toshop Lightroom 5.6
(M acintosh)

H isto ry P a r a m e te rs
converted from
im age/xnikon-nef to
im age/dng,
saved to new location, con
verted from im age/dng to
im age/jpeg, saved to new
location

Table 4.2: An example of modification information contained in a photo’s meta
data.
A photographer may not want to disclose such modification information, espe
cially when such information may undermine what the photographer tries to convey
through the photo. For instance, the contained modification information may cast
doubt on the legitimacy of a photo used as digital photographic evidence in court. In
addition, celebrities may not like the public to know the photos they were depicted
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in are actually photoshopped.

4.1.3

T hree S tages o f D igital P h otos

Based on their propagation process, contemporary digital photos fall into three
stages: “fresh,” “intact,” and “wild.” In the “fresh” stage, a photo is freshly taken,
free from any post-processing manipulations and still stored in the local camera
device. All the m etadata information contained in a “fresh” photo is automatically
embedded by the camera device, instead of being subsequently introduced by a post
processing. In the “intact” stage, a photo has been uploaded online, but remains
intact and has not yet been compressed or resized by the hosting media site. For a
photo in the “wild” stage, it may have undergone resizing, cropping, and other editing
actions conducted by the hosting site, which could change the hidden m etadata too.
By characterizing digital photos in these three different stages, we aim to depict the
status of contemporary digital photos.

4.2

F resh P h o to s

The photos in the “fresh” stage are just freshly created. We examine the m etadata
information, especially sensitive information, embedded in those freshly taken pho
tos. In this section, we first describe the method used for collecting “fresh” photos
and then characterize the collected photos.

4.2.1

D a ta C ollection

The collection of “fresh” photos is not easy due to their inherent characteristics.
We found th at it is an effective way to solicit “fresh” photos through crowdsourcing.
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We posted tasks on a crowdsourcing platform. In each task, the required actions
for a worker to take are two-fold: (1) pick up her smartphone, take a photo, and
then send the photo to us directly via the instrumented email client application,
and (2) take a short survey asking for her demographics information. In addition,
to guarantee the unique origin of each photo, each worker is allowed to take our task
only once.
For each received photo, we employed various methods to check if it is freshly
taken with a smartphone rather than a photo randomly grabbed from the Internet.
In addition, according to our tests, sending a photo via email does not affect its
embedded m etadata.

Thus, our task requirements guarantee th at the collected

photos are freshly created and intact from any post-processing manipulation. The
data collection lasts for two months and we collected 782 photos in total. We filtered
out 170 photos th at are either post-processed or created by other tools. We use the
set of the remaining 612 photos for our study.

4.2.2

C haracterizing “Fresh” P h o to s

D e m o g ra p h ic s. The 612 photos were collected from 612 unique workers from 76
countries. Table 4.3 lists the demographic statistics of the worker participants: (1)
71.7% of workers were male and the rest were female, (2) 45.5% of workers were from
the top five countries, including India, United States, Serbia, Nepal, and Macedonia,
(3) 82.1% of workers were between the ages of 18-34 and 10.8% between 35-44, (4)
47% of workers received the bachelor’s degree, 33.3% with high school degree, and
17.7% with graduate degree, and (5) 72.8% of photos were taken with Android
phones and 18.2% with iOS phones.
(S e n sitiv e ) M e ta d a ta P re v a le n c e . Although Table 4.1 lists quite a few meta98

G ender
Male
Female
NA
NA

P e rc e n t
71.7%
28.3%
NA
NA

C o u n tr y
India
USA
Serbia
Nepal

P e rc e n t
14.4%
13.7%
7.8%
5.3%

A ge
<=17
18-24
2 5 -3 4
3 5 -4 4

P e rc e n t
2.3%
45.8%
36.3%
10.8%

NA

NA

M acedonia

4.4%

>=45

4.7%

E d u c a tio n
G rad u ate
Bachelor
High Sch.
Middle
Sch.
Elem entary

P e rc e n t
17.7%
47.0%
33.3%
1.7%

M o b ile O S
Android
iOS
W indowsP
Blackberry

P e rc e n t
72.8%
18.2%
5.2%
1.8%

0.4%

O ther

2.0%

Table 4.3: Demographic statistics of worker participants
90%

72%

54%
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18%
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M etadata
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Moditication_H

Figure 4.1: Percentage of “fresh” photos containing m etadata information.

Android

iOS

W indows

Blackberry

Figure 4.2: Percentage of “fresh” pho
tos tagged with GPS for smartphone OS.

data fields typically embedded in a photo, a specific photo often has a large portion
of its m etadata information missing. According to our measurement results, we
found th a t two m etadata fields, camera make and model, are the most fundamental
m etadata information. T hat is, if they are missing in a photo, most other m etadata
fields are missing too. Thus, we decide whether a photo contains m etadata informa
tion based on these two fields. A photo is regarded as containing m etadata if either
of the two fields has a non-empty value.
W ith the help of a third-party library [73], we examined the prevalence of m eta
data information among 612 “fresh” photos. We also examined if “fresh” photos
contain any sensitive m etadata fields, including geolocation, owner’s information,
and modification history, as mentioned in Section 4.1. Figure 4.1 shows the percent
ages of photos containing m etadata and sensitive m etadata fields. As high as 86.4%
of “fresh” photos contain m etadata, which demonstrates the prevalence of meta99

d ata information among freshly taken digital photos. As of the sensitive m etadata
fields, 15% of fresh photos are tagged with geolocation information. The results
show th a t although nearly all smartphones are now GPS-equipped, only some of
them are GPS-enabled. The percentage is expected to be even lower if more people
are aware th at smartphones may automatically embed geolocation into photos and
then choose to tu rn the GPS functionality off. None or hardly any of “fresh” photos
contain photographers’ information or modification history in their m etadata. We
speculate th a t it is due to (1) our strict task requirements and (2) the possibility that
these two kinds of sensitive m etadata fields may not be automatically embedded at
the time of a photo shot.
Im p act o f S m artp h on e OS on G eolocation m etad ata. It is interesting to
examine which kind of smartphone OSes are more likely to automatically embed the
sensitive geolocation information into photos. Figure 4.2 shows th a t about one third
of iOS and Windows phones automatically embed geolocation into photos while only
about 10% of Android and Blackberry phones do this.

4 .3

In ta c t P h o to s

In the “intact” stage, photos have been posted online while retaining intact meta
d ata information. From this perspective, “intact photos” could reflect the status of
m etadata in digital photos at the time of being shared online. In this section, we
describe our d ata collection method for “intact” photos and examine the embedded
m etadata information in them.

100

100%

94 . 1%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
M etadata

Geolocation

O w n erjn fo

Modification

F ig u re 4.3: Percentage of “intact” photos containing m etadata information. In
each of four pairs of columns, the left black column represents Flick^p while the
right gray Flick.6.

4.3.1

D ata C ollection

To collect such photos, we crawled photos from Flickr, a large photo-sharing website,
using its API with the download option of “original size,” which guarantees that the
photos remain original and intact from the site. More specifically, we collected two
sets of “intact” photos from Flickr. The first set denoted by Flickrjp contains 18,404
photos exclusively taken with smartphones. Those photos were crawled from the
Flickr group “Smartphone Photography” where all photos were taken with smart
phones. The other set denoted by Flickr.6 contains 43,704 photos uploaded within
six months from July 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014. Our further examination shows
th a t 94.3% of the photos in Flickr.6 were taken with digital cameras.

4.3.2

M etad ata Inform ation E m bedded

Similarly, we examined the percentage of “intact” photos containing m etadata in
formation, especially sensitive m etadata fields. Figure 4.3 shows the percentages of
“intact” photos containing m etadata and sensitive m etadata fields.
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It shows th a t intact photos in Flickr.p and Flickr.6 have quite high percent
ages containing m etadata information, 76.4% and 94.1%, respectively. The results
indicate th at most digital photos taken with either digital cameras or smartphones
contain m etadata when being uploaded online. In addition, 37.1% Flickr.p and
27.2% Flickr-6 photos contain GPS information. Considering 15% of “fresh” pho
tos tagged with geolocation, we speculate th at some photo owners may embed GPS
information into photos during post processing to better show their photographic
works on Flickr. Moreover, up to 65.6% and 88.1% Flickr.p and Flickr.6 photos con
tain the photographer information, which could pose a great risk of identity leakage
to photo owners. Additionally, about a half of Flickr.6 photos contain modification
information. Most photos in the set are taken with professional digital cameras and
photo owners often show intense interest in refining their works with image process
ing software. By contrast, a much lower percentage of Flickr.p photos taken with
smartphones are modified.

4 .4

W ild P h o to s

In the “wild” stage, most online photos have lingered on the Internet for a while and
may have experienced multiple modifications by the hosting sites. In this section,
we attem pt to figure out the m etadata information remaining in the “wild” photos
and explore how the top media sites handle the photos hosted on them.

4.4.1

D a ta C ollection

We employed two methods to collect “wild” photos. The first method is to randomly
collect photos by Google Images Search. In the custom search control panel, we set
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the image type as photo, file type as JP G /JP E G files, image size as larger than
400*300, and the date range from January 1, 2012 until January 1, 2015. Nearly all
digital photos are in JPE G format. The specified image size can filter out most of
graphs, drawings, and other non-photo images. In addition, we only focus on the
photos posted online in the past three years. We totally collected 38,140 photos in
this way and denoted them by Googlelmage.
Secondly, to investigate top media sites’ policies on handling photos, we need to
obtain a representative set of media sites. Alexa categorizes millions of sites and
defines a list of site categories [75], from which we selected seven categories, which are
“social networking,” “weblog,” “news,” “college,” “government,” “classified,” and
“shopping” . The reason why we chose them is th at presumably the sites in these
categories usually host large amounts of photos. Alexa provides for each category
a list of the top 500 sites. We selected the top 100 sites for each category and thus
we had 700 unique top ranked sites in total as our subject representative of online
media sites.
Not every photo appearing on a site is hosted by the site. A photo is considered
being hosted on a site only if its image URL has the same domain as the site URL.
Only the photos hosted on a site are eligible to be used for studying the site’s polices.
During our photo collection from each site, we only crawled the photos hosted on
th at site. Specifically, for each of the 700 sites, we attem pted to crawl 1,000 photos
th at appeared online after January 1, 2012. Those photos are expected to reflect
the photo policy used by the hosting site under an assumption th at the site has
not made significant changes to its photo handling policy in the recent years. Due
to unexpected factors including network connection failure and access permission
denied, we were able to crawl 97,664 photos from 679 unique sites. To ensure the
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representativeness of these photos, we filtered out the sites from which less than 10
photos were collected. Finally, we had 97,403 photos for 611 unique sites as our
dataset for the study, about 160 photos per site on average. This set of photos are
denoted as TopSitesPhoto.

4.4.2

E thical C onsideration

In our study, we leveraged several methods to collect photos, including: (1) solic
iting “fresh” photos from crowdsourcing workers, (2) crawling photos from Flickr
using its API, (3) random Google Image Search, and (4) crawling top websites for
limited amounts of photos. Note th at our crowdsourcing study has been vetted
and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at our institution. During
our photo collection, we did not receive any concerns or get warnings from those
involved sites and did not interfere with their normal operations. In addition, with
the collected photos, we anonymized the m etadata information embedded before
using them for study. We strictly abide by the copyright licenses if present.
Figure 4.4 depicts the number of photos crawled from each site. It shows that
about 80% of sites have over 60 photos crawled, about 35% of sites have over 120
photos crawled, and about 20% have over 300 photos crawled. We crawled a maxi
mum number of 1,026 photos for one site2.

4.4.3

M etad ata Inform ation E m bedded

Figure 4.5 shows the percentages of “wild” photos containing m etadata, especially
those sensitive m etadata fields. It shows th at the percentages of “wild” photos con
taining m etadata information in the sets Googlelmage and TopSitesPhoto are 41.5%
2We crawled the site twice and collected over 1,000 photos.
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and 40.4%, respectively, which are much smaller than th at of “intact” photos (up
to 94.1%). In addition, very few “wild” photos are tagged with GPS coordinates.
In Googlelmage and TopSitesPhoto, the percentages are 0.6% and 1.8%, respec
tively, smaller th an those of “fresh” and “intact” photos. Moreover, only 13.2%
of Googlelmage photos and 8.7% of TopSitesPhoto photos contain photographers’
identification information. About 25.4% of Googlelmage photos and 14.1% of Top
SitesPhoto photos contain modification history information. These results imply
th a t compared to “fresh” and “intact” photos, a considerable proportion of “wild”
photos have their embedded m etadata stripped away.

4.4.4

Inferring O nline S ite s’ P h o to H andling Policies

Based on TopSitesPhoto, we have built a set of photos for each of the 611 unique
sites. We attem pt to infer a site’s photo handling policy by characterizing the photos
collected from the site. Specifically, we aim to answer two questions about a site’s
photo handling policy. One is whether the site resizes the photos it hosts, and
the other is whether the site removes the m etadata information embedded in those
photos.
W h eth er a site resizes its h o sted p h otos? After upload, a photo is typically
compressed and resized by the hosting site in several sizes. For instance, Instagram
uses an image size of 640 pixels in width and 640 pixels in height for nearly all its
hosted photos. More commonly, an online site confines a photo’s longest side length
to a small set of values. Flickr resizes its photos in the following sizes: 100 pixels (on
the longest side), 240 pixels, 800 pixels, 1600 pixels and so on [81]. Therefore, if the
majority of photos hosted by a site have their longest side (width or height) lengths
falling into a small set of numbers, then we speculate th at the site does resize the
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F ig u re 4.6: Percentage of sites estimated to resize their photos across the seven
categories.
photos it hosts.
For each photo in our dataset, we retrieved its longest side length from its file
information. About 2% of photos had no image size information available and were
ruled out. Suppose “D D D D ” is the longest side length value th at is observed most
frequently on a site. We calculated the proportion of the photos on the site with
their longest side length of the value “D D D D " . We then leveraged the proportion
number to decide whether the site resizes its photos or not. If over 50% of photos
on the site have the longest side length of “D D D D " , the site is considered to
resize its photos. The argument is based on our observation th at among more than
40,000 photos downloaded from Flickr with “original size” option, only 3.47% have
their longest side length of 1,600 pixels, while this length value occurs much more
frequently for the photos th at have been resized.
Figure 4.6 shows what percentage of sites th a t are regarded to resize the photos
on their sites across the 7 categories. It is not surprising to see th at only 3.0%
of “College” sites and 10.5% “Government” sites have resized their photos, since
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colleges and governments usually have sufficient hosting resources to store highresolution photos. A bout 36.7% of “News” sites are estimated to resize the photos
they host. A close examination reveals th a t news sites often resize their photos to
many different sizes, which thereby lowers the percentage of photos with a unique
longest side length size. In reality, there are probably much more news sites th at
resize their photos. In each of the other four categories, “Social networking,” “We
blog,” “Classified,” and “Shopping,” over 50% of sites have resized the photos they
host. Th sites in those categories often contain large amounts of photos and resizing
photos is an effective means to save valuable storage space. Irrespective of cate
gories, at least one third of all sites in our dataset are regarded to resize the photos
they host. Note th a t our results represent a lower bound of the percentage of sites
th a t resize their photos.
W h eth er a site strip s ou t th e m etad ata inform ation em b ed d ed in th e
p h otos it h osts? There is another issue people may be concerned about when they
upload photos online. As mentioned before, we use two fields in the m etadata—
camera make and model—to determine if the m etadata information exists or not.
For each site in our dataset, we calculated the percentage of its photos containing
m etadata information. Note th at a photo may have its m etadata information erased
by its owner before posted online. Thus, our estimated percentage of online sites
th a t strip out the m etadata information of the photos they host represents an upper
bound.
Figure 4.7 shows the CDF of the percentage of photos containing m etadata
information on each of the 611 sites in the seven categories. About 16% of sites
have no photos containing m etadata information. It is highly probable th a t those
sites remove the m etadata information from all hosted photos. About 45% of total
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sites have at least half of their hosted photos containing m etadata information. We
determine th a t a site adopts a policy of removing photo m etadata information if
no photos hosted by the site contain m etadata information; otherwise, the site is
considered to preserve the m etadata information of photos it hosts.
Figure 4.8 shows the percentage of sites in each category which are estimated to
preserve the m etadata information of photos they host. Again we found th at the two
categories “College” and “Government” present quite different statistical character
istics in preserving the photo m etadata than the rest five categories. Specifically,
98% of college sites and 93.7% of government sites are estimated to preserve the
photo m etadata information.

Combined with the above estimation results on a

site’s photo resizing policy, we draw the conclusion th at college and government
sites seldom resize the photos they host or remove the embedded photo m etadata
information. In each of the other five categories, the proportions of the sites th at
preserve the photo m etadata information are between 40% and 60%, much lower
than those of college and government sites. On average, up to 68.4% of the top sites
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F ig u re 4.8: Percentage of sites estimated to preserve the photo m etadata informa
tion across the seven categories.
in the seven categories preserve the photo m etadata information, which suggests
th a t a number of online photos may still have their m etadata information open to
public access for years.

4.5

R e-Id e n tific a tio n A tta ck

Except the sensitive m etadata fields including geolocation, owner’s information, and
modification history, other m etadata fields may appear relatively innocent. However,
in this section, we dem onstrate the feasibility of exploiting a trivial looking m etadata
field for re-identification attack.
Even without the photographer information explicitly included, a photographer
can still be identified based on even only one photo she ever took. This can happen
through a new attack vector—the camera serial number field in the photo m etadata.
A camera serial number can uniquely identify a camera most of the time.3 All photos
3A serial number is unique within a camera brand. Combined with camera make and model, a
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taken with a same digital camera are supposed to have the same serial number if
provided.4 In theory, a single photo with a camera serial number embedded could
be used to trace other online photos taken with the same camera. Those photos
together facilitate identifying the photographer.
We figured out th a t a public online database stolencamerafinder [74] could be
leveraged to search for online photos tagged with a given camera serial number,
although the online service was established to help find stolen cameras. For each
given serial number, stolencamerafinder returns a list of online photos taken with
the same camera, and for each photo provides the page URL where the photo is
posted and the image URL linking to the photo.
Next, we do experiments to prove it quite easy to identify a photo owner with
only one photo she ever shared online in the case th a t the photo has a camera serial
number embedded. About 12% of the “wild” photos in the two sets Googlelmage and
TopSitesPhoto were found to contain the serial number information. We randomly
selected 2,000 unique serial numbers from them, then manually searched each serial
number in the stolencamerafinder, and finally got back search results for 1,037 serial
numbers in total. Note th at not every camera serial number could get search results
back. For those 1,037 serial numbers, by following the image URLs returned, we
collected 38,140 photos th a t were posted on 4,712 unique websites. The photos
collected for a specific serial number only represent a subset of all photos available
online and tagged with the same serial number, due to the impossibility of finding
all online photos with a given serial number.
Figure 4.9 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number of
photos th at a single serial number links to. About 30% of serial numbers link to
serial number can uniquely identify a camera.
4Smartphones typically do not store their serial numbers in their photos.
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over 25 photos and about 10% link to over 100 photos. The average number of
photos linked to a same serial number is 36.8, the median is 10, and the maximum
is 923. W ith the considerable number of photos tagged with a same camera serial
number, together with the page URLs where the photos are posted, and the photos
already existing in the photo sets Googlelmage and TopSitesP hoto, we were able
to set up a knowledge base for each serial number (tentatively a digital camera).
The rich information available can evidently disclose much more privacy information
about the camera owner than a single serial number itself. This demonstrates the
potential of a camera serial number as an attractive attack vector for mounting
privacy attacks.
Id en tify in g a P h otograph er. The page URL and the page where a photo is
posted can provide im portant clues to reveal a photographer’s online identity. For
instance, the URL http s://p lu s.g o o g le.co m /X Y Z / p h o to s suggests th at the photog
rapher should have a Google+ [79] account with the ID of “XYZ” . Following the
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URL allows us to retrieve more information about the photographer, such as her
real name, college attended, current employer, and photos posted on her account
page. We have observed a great many such URL strings in our dataset with photog
raphers’ online social networks (OSNs) account IDs embedded. The involved OSNs
include but not limited to Flickr, Facebook [77], Tw itter [78], Google-f, and 500px
[80]. A photographer may have her multiple OSN accounts disclosed in this way.
Table 4.4 lists the information typically contained in an account profile of the five
social networks mentioned above. It shows th at an account profile typically contains
demographics and other sensitive information including age, gender, education, oc
cupation, living city, other OSN accounts, and much more. Once one OSN account
is identified, the true identity of the user in the real world can be readily disclosed.
OSN

i Flickr
; 500px
\ Google-tj T w itter

[ Facebook

A c c o u n t P r o file In fo rm a tio n
Name, O ccupation, Living City, Hometown, Gender, Personal Website(s), Em ail, Joined Tim e, Biography, Age, Religion
N am e, Biography, Living City, C ontact, other OSN accounts
N am e, G ender, Living City, Colleges A ttended, C urrent Employer,
W ork Experience
N am e, O ccupation, Living City, Telephone, Email, Personal Webpage(s). Joined Tim e, Photos and Videos, Tweets, Followings, Fol
lowers and Favorites
N am e, Living City, Gender, Education, Telephone, other OSN ac
counts, Life Events

T a b le 4.4: List of the information typically contained in an account profile in each
of the five OSNs. Note th a t the listed information represents the maximum amount
of information available with public permissions of an OSN account.
Figure 4.10 shows the percentage of serial numbers from which we are able to
identify the corresponding camera owners’ IDs in one or more OSNs by scrutinizing
the page URLs where the photos were posted.

Among the 1,037 unique serial

numbers in our dataset, 51.4% (533) of the serial numbers have the camera owners’
OSN accounts identified, and 9.0% (93) have account IDs in two or more OSNs
identified. And for one serial number we even identified the camera owner’s four
account IDs in four OSNs respectively.
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Figure 4.10: Percentage of camera serial numbers (SNs) with camera owners’ OSN
accounts identified.
As mentioned before, we were able to retrieve about 37 online photos on average
for a given serial number. Those photos tagged with the same serial number may
contain m etadata information th a t could help identify the photographer. We closely
examined the m etadata information embedded in the related photos for each of the
remaining 504 serial numbers w ithout any OSN accounts identified in the previ
ous step. Among them, we successfully identified the photographers for 116 serial
numbers. Compared to the photographers with their OSN accounts identified, the
available information on those 116 photographers are restricted to the photo meta
d ata embedded, mainly including their names, the processing softwares, and OSes
used. However, more information could be collected online once a person’s name
is identified. Overall, 62.6% (649) of serial numbers have had their photographers
identified.
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4 .6

D isc u ssio n

One goal of this work is to track the propagation of the sensitive m etadata informa
tion embedded in the digital photos at different stages. One ideal way is to monitor
the process of creation, modification, and elimination of the m etadata information
contained in a same set of photos th at sequentially experience three stages— “fresh,”
“intact,” and “wild.” However, it is very hard to obtain such an ideal photo set in
large-scale. Instead, we employed different data collection methods and obtained
three kinds of photo sets to represent the digital photos at the corresponding three
stages.
We collected 612 valid “fresh” photos through crowdsourcing in a period of two
months. Each photo collected was taken by a unique participant with a unique
device, and participants from 76 countries contributed to this dataset. In addition,
those photos were solicited directly from smartphones and no photos taken with
digital cameras were collected in order to avoid data contamination. Therefore,
although the dataset size of “fresh” photos is not comparable to those of “intact”
and “wild” photos, its representativeness is high enough for this study.
To infer online media sites’ policies on handling m etadata information in the
photos they host, we adopt a passive approach, th at is, by examining the m etadata
information of the photos collected from the sites. Actually, we once considered to
take an active approach to detect media sites’ policies, by subm itting (uploading)
different types of photos to the sites, then re-downloading them, and comparing
m etadata fields. However, we had to abandon this approach because most of the
611 sites in the seven categories have specific user groups and are not open to public
registration, not to mention photo uploading.
Although it is known th at a camera serial number can uniquely identify a camera
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to some extent, we are not aware of any previous research work revealing potential
threats arising from this attribute in an empirical and systematic manner.

We

dem onstrated the feasibility of re-identification attack by exploiting camera serial
number. We were able to identify over 60% of photo owners based on their camera
serial numbers available in a public online database.
W hen a user shares a digital photo online, two questions about privacy issues are
readily raised. One is whether sensitive hidden m etadata information is embedded
in the photo. The other concerning question is what the media site will do with
the photo. According to our experiment results, a considerable proportion of digital
photos contain sensitive m etadata information, and many sites resize the photos they
host or remove the embedded photo m etadata information. In our future work, we
will develop a browser extension to give users direct answers to these two questions.
S e n s itiv e M e t a d a t a
Geolocation
P ho to g rap h er’s Name
M odification History
C am era Serial Number

P o te n t ia l T h r e a t s
Location disclosure, house robbery
Identity disclosure
Underm ining photo’s authenticity
Re-identification attack

W e b s ite ’s P o lic y
M etadata removing
: Photo resizing
{ NA
NA

t

Table 4.5: Main functions of the browser extension prototype
The major functions th at the tool should have are illustrated in Table 4.5. Specif
ically, once the sensitive m etadata information in a photo being uploaded is detected,
the browser extension should issue an alarm by popping up a window on the screen
and provide customized alert information, including the sensitive m etadata infor
mation embedded, the corresponding privacy risks, and the current visiting site’s
policy on photo handling. Note th at the browser extension should display the alert
information only when the privacy-related m etadata information is detected, and
thus it should not often interfere with normal photo upload workflows. Although
there are already browser extensions for photo m etadata visualization, we will focus
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on informing users of the sensitive m etadata contained and customized privacy risks.
Moreover, we will ensure users’ right to know the actions th at the hosting media
sites will perform on their photos.

4 .7

R e la te d W ork

Several previous works conduct user studies to understand users’ privacy decisions
during the photo sharing process and their privacy concerns on others’ photo-sharing
activities. Clark et al. [82] revealed the problem of unintended photo storage without
users’ awareness, which is mainly caused by the autom atic features of cloud-based
photo backup services.

Ahern et al.

[83] found that mobile users’ decisions to

post photos privately or publicly were determined more by identity or impression
concerns than security concerns. Besmer et al. [84] made similar findings. They
studied users’ perception of being tagged in undesired photos uploaded by others.
They found th at a user’s privacy concerns on th a t domain were mainly related to
identity and impression management within her existing social circles. Henne et al.
[85] showed in their survey results th at among the information potentially disclosed
by the tagged photos, personal references and location data raised most privacy
concerns.
More related to our work, several researchers examined the privacy threat posed
by the textual m etadata information contained in online photos.

Friedland and

Sommer [86] focused on the privacy threats posed by the geolocation information
available online.

They showed th at the geolocation d ata could be exploited to

mount privacy attacks using three scenarios on Craigslist, Tw itter, and YouTube,
respectively. Pesce et al. [91] dem onstrated th at photo tagging on Facebook could be
exploited to enhance prediction of users’ information like gender, city, and country.
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Another work from Mahmood and Desmedt [90] discussed possible privacy violations
from Googled-’s policy th at any users who access a photo can see its m etadata
online.

While the above three works addressed the privacy issues with photos,

we investigated the privacy issues with online photos on a much larger scale. We
assessed the privacy risks arising from leakage of all possible sensitive m etadata
information rather than just geolocation data. Moreover, our study is not restricted
to one media site. Instead, we collect our photo dataset from hundreds of top-ranked
websites and through crowdsourcing platforms. Those photos cover various stages,
i.e., “fresh,” “intact,” and “wild.” In addition, we introduce a new attack vector
and show its unexpected power in conducting a re-identification attack. We also
performed a large-scale measurement of photo handling policies adopted by various
categories of media sites.
Another large body of previous work has attem pted to enhance people’s privacy
when sharing photos online. Besmer et al. [96] designed a privacy enhancement
tool to improve the photo tagging process on Facebook. The tool allows tagged
users to negotiate online with the photo uploaders about the permission settings
on the photo.

Fang and LeFevre [92] built a machine learning model for OSN

users to configure privacy settings automatically with a limited number of rules
provided. Zerr et al. [97] developed privacy classification models for users to search
for private photos about themselves posted by others at an early stage. Henne et
al. [95] proposed a watchdog service th at allows users to keep track of potentially
harmful photos uploaded by others at the expense of sharing their location data with
the service. R a et al. [93] presented a selective encryption algorithm th at enables a
photo to hide its “secret” part from the host photo-sharing site and the unauthorized
viewers and only expose its “public” part. Ilia et al. [94] refined the access control
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mechanism currently used by OSNs on photo sharing. The new mechanism allows
the depicted users in a photo to decide the exposure of their own face, and could
present photos with the restricted faces blurred out to a visitor. Complementary
to those works attem pting to enhance privacy on the web server side, this study
assesses the privacy risks arising from sensitive photo m etadata and provides some
guidelines for developing client-side privacy leakage prevention tools, which should
be able to alert online users of potential privacy risks posed by uploading photos and
also inform them of the photo handling policies adopted by the currently visiting
website.
To the best of our knowledge, we have conducted the first large-scale empirical
measurement study of the status of contemporary digital photos at the three different
stages. In addition to examining the sensitive m etadata information embedded,
we inferred the photo handling policies used by hundreds of top-ranked sites, and
proposed to exploit the camera identification number as an attack vector for re
identification attack. We are not aware of any previous work studying these topics.

4 .8

C o n clu sio n

In this chapter, we performed a data-driven assessment of privacy risks on con
tem porary digital photos. We first collected from the Web nearly 200,000 digital
photos a t three different stages as our dataset. Then for photos at each stage, we
measured the prevalence of m etadata and assessed the privacy risks posed by meta
data leakage. We found th at m etadata is quite prevalent among digital photos at
each stage. In particular, 15% of “fresh” photos, about 30% “intact” photos, and
about 1% “wild” photos were tagged with GPS coordinates. The percentage of
“wild” photos containing other sensitive m etadata information is also much lower
119

than th a t of “intact” photos. A possible reason is th at online sites often remove the
m etadata information of the photos they host. Our speculation was confirmed by
our investigation of photo handling policies based on nearly 100,000 photos crawled
from 679 top sites in seven categories. We further found th at photo policies used
by a site vary with the category th at the site belongs to. Finally, we proposed
to use the camera serial number as a new attack vector towards privacy inference
and dem onstrated its power in deriving both online and real-world identities of a
photographer with ju st one photo she ever took. In our future work, we will build
a browser extension prototype to prevent users’ photo privacy leakage and increase
their knowledge of the online services’ policies on photo handling.
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C hapter 5
C onclusion and Future W ork
Internet business is playing a more and more im portant role in the global economy.
In this dissertation, we mainly focus on uncovering and detecting the fraudulent
activities in two kinds of im portant Internet businesses, online advertising system
and e-commerce system. In our first project, we proposed a novel ehallenge-response
based detection mechanism for advertisers to independently detect fraudulent clicks
on their advertisements without the help of either publishers or ad networks. We
verified the effectiveness of the detection mechanism by deploying it in the real world.
In our second project, we introduced a newly emerging threat to the e-commmerce
reputation system. By infiltrating several underground markets providing the SRE
(seller-reputation-escalation) service, we performed a deep analysis of the opera
tional characteristics of those markets. We also investigated the effectiveness of
SRE services and found th at online sellers using SRE services can increase their
store reputation 10 times faster than legitimate ones. In addition, e-commerce sites
represent one kind of sites th at are hit hardest by trash web traffic generated by bad
bots. To assess the potential privacy risks arising from online photo sharing, in our
third project, we performed a data-driven assessment of privacy risks on contempo
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rary digital photos. We found th a t privacy sensitive m etadata information is quite
prevalent among digital photos at each stage. We also proposed to use the camera
serial number as a new attack vector towards privacy inference and demonstrated
its power in deriving both online and real-world identities of a photographer with
just one photo she ever took.
The e-commerce business is increasingly thriving in the recent several years. In
our future work, we will still focus our attention on the fake transaction problem
that are greatly affecting the continuous development of e-commerce business. Our
goal is to develop a practical fake transaction detection system for e-commerce
marketplaces to identify a fake transaction before it is finished. Our previous study
on the SEE service has shown th a t to finish a fake transaction, the hired human
laborers have to follow the operational steps predefined by the SRE market operators
and it usually takes them several days to complete a fake transaction. Thus we
could first research on the operational strategies th at were specially designed for
conducting fake transactions and then leverage the inferred behavioral patterns of
human laborers on the e-commerce sites as the signature to identify fake transactions
in time. We plan to cooperate with one large e-commerce marketplace to implement
and deploy the detection system.
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